1: Coon E-5 (1926-1927) 1931 MX3 Rif MX3

man with whom she is involved is punished just as was the first convicted offender. If she has been publicly exposed several times as a prostitute, the men of her *bone* kidnap her, carry her into the mountains, and there kill her and hide her body. No notice is taken of her absence, and if the councillors hear about the affair they pretend not to have done so.

If a woman catches her husband in the act of adultery with another woman, she ordinarily goes back to her own people and tells them of it. The men of her family, her father, brothers, or paternal uncle, may bring the matter up before the councillors and have the husband fined and divorced. In many cases, however, the men of her *vein* persuade the woman to do nothing about it, thinking that to make a commotion would only cause the disruption of the *bone*. In case the woman has married outside her *bone*, whether or not action takes place depends largely upon the respect which her own *bone* has for that of her husband. In any case, the sacramental defilement of the man is not considered as great as that of the woman in the opposite situation.

Blood money. Although murders, woundings, and adultery caught in the act are offenses beyond the jurisdiction of the council of the great and are relegated to the tribal council, one consequence of them falls directly upon the councillors. This is the assessment and collection of the *diith*, or blood money. Whereas the tribal council has the right to impose the fine, the council of the great has charge of compensation to the injured family. This takes place after the tribal council has finished its judgment and punishment. Murder is atoned for by the payment of a sum between one and five hundred dollars. The amount varies from *canton* to *canton*, but within a *canton* is constant and inflexible. Wounds are paid for at the rate of twenty-five dollars a month for each month of convalescence, until the injured man is able to work again.

The man who committed the crime pays, if he is able. If he is unable to raise the money by selling his property, the *bone* pays. In some *bones* the group as a whole always pays, whether the guilty one is able to raise the money or not; in others a man other than the guilty one pays, with the understanding that he is to receive the total of the next blood-money payment to his *bone*.

In the *bones* which pay individually, receipts are given to the children of the deceased, and if he left no children, to his father. Children receive the money on the basis that one boy is equal to two girls. If the deceased leaves neither children nor father, it is divided among the members of the *bone*. Many *bones* refuse altogether to receive blood money, preferring to take it out in blood by killing a member of the hostile *bone*, in which case, after the punishment of the tribal council is finished, the account is considered by the councillors as settled. Frequently the injured *bone* accepts the blood money, then suffers a revulsion of feeling and takes blood vengeance in addition, in which case it is required to return the payment.

Murders within the *bone* rarely occur, and are considered unnatural crimes. No blood money is assessed, because such an offender is instantly killed by his own people if he is unable to escape. A man fleeing such a crime will not be harbored by any Riffian, and must continue until he has left the Rif altogether. Even in this case he must take care to go to some place to which Riffians do not ordinarily travel, lest revenge overtake him later.

Attending weddings outside the canton. Another duty of the council of the great, this time of a bloodless nature, is to attend weddings of other councillors or their sons in other *cantons* or *fifths*. This is done in order to foster friendly relations between the two groups.

3: Hart E-5 (1953-1954)1954 MX3 Rif MX3

618 596 Although a *jājghū* of this type could take no part in the governmental activities of the village in which it was located, it had to assume as full responsibilities as the other, native *ijūjgha* in time of war. As many of the new *ijūjgha* considered this an unfair arrangement, they often broke away from the parent *thārfiqth* to found the nuclei of new *thārfiqīn* of their own. All the families in the villages of Bū Zdūr and Marrūwī, and most of those of Thirkuzīn, in Aith 'Abdallāh, are of this type; they are still considered by the locals as foreigners from Aith 'Ammarth, although they banded together long ago to found a new *thārfiqth* of their own, Aith Ḥandu Dāwūd, which has now grown into a *farīqath* or canton.

In the Wuryāghlī sense of being a «whole family», the internal solidarity of the *thārfiqth* is greatly strengthened not only by the kin ties of the native members, but by the fictional relationship of the stranger accretions as well. Thus, while the individual *ijūjgha* of a *thārfiqth* may be small in number of personnel, the *thārfiqth* as a whole can usually supply some fifty men of age to fast during Ramaḍān, therefore being capable of bearing arms in addition. It was the *thārfiqth* and not the *jājghū* which functioned as the unit of vengeance, as the unity of the whole family was an absolute necessity for its continued existence. Although murders within the *thārfiqth* did occur, they were very rare and considered unnatural crimes; the local holy man, *sharīf* or *murābiṭ* was brought around at once to appease the bereaved and to act as moderator, and the offenders were either killed or exiled immediately to prevent a feud from spreading. To date, I know personally of only one case of one man killing another in the same *thārfiqth* (in Tharwa n Muḥammādi 'Alūsh, Aith Yūsuf u 'Alī): he was instantly shot by one of the sons of the dead man, and as he himself had no sons or brothers to carry on the feud, the problem ended then and there. Equilibrium was completely reestablished when the killer married his victim's sister, his own parallel cousin.

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618 628 Each *thārfiqth*, however, was usually at war with its neighbors. Minor quarrels over ownership of land or of irrigation water could and did lead to blood feuds of such extraordinary savageness that on some occasions they did not stop until one or the other of the participating families was completely wiped out. The smaller the group,

3: Hart E-5 (1953-1954)1954 MX3 Rif MX3

the greater the number of powerful allies it had to have in order to survive. Periods of peace and quiet were very infrequent events; in the old days every house had a watch tower, forming a second story, in which the owner had a commanding view of the whole countryside. He could thus spot an unwary enemy and drop him dead in his tracks with the greatest of ease and pleasure. The poverty and infertility of the soil was a factor which contributed heavily to an atmosphere of eternal suspicion and mistrust of one's neighbor. Violence was so common that, analyzing it from an anthropological standpoint, Montagne remarks with considerable justification that the concept of the *thārfiqth* obscured and often even obliterated those of the larger political units above it (8). The acceptance of the *dīyath* or blood money by the murdered man's *thārfiqth* was a rare phenomenon; most families, particularly those of Aith Bū 'Ayyāsh, the political division which has the greatest fighting reputation of all, preferred to keep the feud going. I have been informed that in Aith Bū 'Ayyāsh feuding assumed such extreme proportions that, to take one example, the village of Aith Bū Khrif knew *no peace at all* until the Spanish occupation. Another instance on record, cited both by Montagne (9) and Maldonado (10), tells of a feud which started between two *thārfiqīn* of Aith 'Abdallāh, Aith al-Qāsim and Iburāsan; I have personally verified their accounts by conversation with two of the participants.

The shooting began after the murder of a dog which belonged to the guest of the head man of Iburāsan, as the Aith al-Qāsim refused to pay the blood money (50 duros) claimed. Twelve men were killed in combat the first day; each side got its allies and soon the feud spread all through the *farīqas* of Ibunahāren and Aith 'Amar u Ḥmid. In the following years, 40 men died on one side and 62 on the other, in pitched battles alone. This does not take into account the even larger number of those who were shot down in ambush or poisoned with arsenic sold by merchants at Alhucemas. The con-

(8) Montagne, Robert: Les Berbères et le Makhzen dans le Sud du Maroc, Paris 1930, p. 240.

(9) Montagne, 1930, pp. 239-240.

(10) Maldonado, Eduardo: El Regui, Tetuán 1952, pp. 33-34.

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quered group eventually decided to leave the country; almost no one was left but old men, women and children, who sought refuge in the sacred mountain of Zarhūn (where Mūlāy Idrīs, the first Sultan of Morocco, is buried), after having sold all their property in order to try to hire a man who would avenge their dead. The vengeance plan was carefully worked out, and the *'adūl* made the following stipulations: 10.000 riyāls if the bullet killed an enemy; 5.000 if it wounded one; and 2.500 if it missed its mark. In any event, the hired killer was usually found the next day with a bullet through his own head, due as often as not to the careful marksmanship of a small boy hidden behind a lentiscus bush.

To give further evidence of lengths which the people of Aith Wuryāghil used to go to put their enemies out of the way, I was told by one of my informants that someone had once insulted his father. The father, an *amghār* or councillor of considerable repute in his own village (Aith Mūsā u 'Amar of Aith 'Alī), would not brook the insult, and promised his *akhammās* a new *jillāb* (11) and a considerable sum of money if he disposed of the insulter. The *akhammās* went out on his master's errand, but seems to have had a change of heart somewhere during his journey, for he decided that he personally had no quarrel with the other party. Thus there was no reason to kill him. But, with the prospect of a fat reward in his pocket, he

(11) (Riffian **ajdab**): a woolen cloak with sleeves and hood worn by men. In the days before Abd al-Karim it was made of brown home-spun and reached the knees only; today ankle-length jillabs are much more in vogue, and the younger generation prefers them made of European cloth. The old woolen turban, **thaghrafth**, is also no longer worn, and has been replaced by a white cotton turban among the older men; the younger ones, particularly those who have traveled outside the Rif, prefer the tarbush. The trousers have become baggier in recent years as well; the only item of distinctly Riffian clothing which remains is the toe-strap sandal of esparto grass. It is interesting to note that the old short and decorated Riffian jillabs can only be seen today in the Ghumara.

Women's clothing on the other hand, is far more conservative. The women of Aith Wuryaghil wear a silken band around the head, tied in the back, over which is placed a cotton shawl; a long cotton or silk shirt (if cotton, it is white; if silk, red or yellow) coming to the knees, with blue trousers underneath, coming to halfway between knees and feet; and a heavy red woolen belt. Most women go barefoot, but some, like many of the men, have adopted Spanish sneakers (alpargatas). Both sexes wear babouches (Riffian **iharkusen**, Arabic **blaghi**) only on festival occasions, provided they are rich enough to afford them.

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announced upon his arrival home that he had shot the man and returned undetected. The *amghār* soon learned the truth, and locked up his *akhammās* for three days without food or water. He then sent him packing, after cutting off his ears.

Under circumstances like these, in which even women did not dare go to work alone in the fields and in which men always had to carry their rifles to the mosque or to the market, it might seem, carrying Montagne's argument one step further, that no groupings larger than the *thārfiqth* could exist at all. They do exist, however, thanks to the mechanism of the *liff* alliance system, and the next one up the scale is the *jamā'ath* or *dshār*, the «village», a collection of both related and unrelated *thārfiqin*. I use the word «village» advisedly, nevertheless; its geographical limits, known perfectly by the tribesmen themselves, are difficult for the outsider to discern owing to the linear nature of the terrain and the scattered house distribution. Its site may be determined by the excessive growth of one *thārfiqth*, by the proximity of a spring, by discords and internal struggles, or by any number of other causes. Its two principal requirements are a communal village mosque (there is often more than one mosque to a village) and a local assembly consisting of the headmen *(izdīfen*, sing. *azdīf)* of its component *thārfiqin*. This assembly is still in large measure the governing body of the village, and it administrates village affairs largely according customary law *('urf)*; under its jurisdiction fall matters relating to individual and family order, theft of small articles such as eggs and poultry and olives and grapes, vigilance of orchards, reparation of irrigation ditches, and the like. It meets once a week in the courtyard of one of the village mosques, or under a wild olive tree, to hear and try cases of local importance. It elects the *faqīh* of the mosque, who gives Qur'anic instruction to the boys of the village, and the *shaikh arfiiiāḥath* or *aquwwām* to direct work in the fields and to oversee the *tawīzas* or corvees working on irrigation projects (12). Today it also elects a moderator to direct and keep order during its meetings; he is usually the village *jārī* or headman. The mosque, school and cemetery are all communal property of the *jamā-*

(12) Paniagua y Santos, José María: «Notas sobre el derecho consuetudinario de la propiedad en el Rif». **Archivos del Instituto de Estudios Africanos**, núm. 4, primer semestre, Madrid, Junio 1948, pp. 1-44. My references on p. 14 and pp. 20-21.

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to the interest of the murderer and his family to come to terms quickly, for if they tried to go against the council, their days were numbered.

The *imghāren* were the real power in the land, and although the Sultan used to nominate *quyād* (pl. of *qā'id*), these were usually nothing but *imghāren* whose local prestige was slightly greater than that of their fellows. In Aith Wuryāghil, the *Bilād as-Saiba* par excellence, a *qā'id* could not govern in the same manner as he did an Arab tribe; if he tried to institute reforms without having the force to back them up, he was likely to be quietly done away with. It was the assembled *imghāren* of all the «fifths» who dictated policy if the tribe was threatened from outside. They declared war, treated for peace, and contracted alliances with other tribes, and they did so jointly. The Riffians are democratic almost to the point of anarchy, and if any man was considered better than his neighbor, it was only because he had more brothers or cousins to help him out in case a fight started. The excellent description given by Coon of what is apt to happen at the meeting of an *aghrau* affords us a wonderful insight into the Wuryāghlī character.

> «... The locality depends on mutual convenience. Each fifth occupies a section of the circle. A moderator talks to the members until a common attitude in regard to the subject of the meeting is agreed upon. The moderator now having received the instructions of his constituency, he approaches the center of the circle, and the councillors left on the outer ring finger their rifles and express their readiness to defend their spokesman if he gets into a violent argument. They discuss the matter at hand all talking at once or whenever they please, since there is no chief moderator, and for one member to bid another to be quiet would be ample excuse for murder. Moderators of a fifth usually agree within themselves and the argument soon develops into a consideration of how many fifths favor one opinion and how many the other. The moderator of one fifth may lead the moderator of another aside and whisper to him outside the ring, trying to bribe him to come over to his way of thinking. If the second moderator succumbs to this, he returns to the central ring and tries to change the attitude of the other representatives of his fifth. The parley goes on until a unanimous decision is reached or until the councillors begin fighting among themselves

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and the meeting breaks up in a battle. In this case the opponents form martial alliances, and the fight continues until one side has been defeated and made to pay indemnity to the other. Even when the council ends peacefully it takes at least a week before they reach an agreement» (14).

To his may be appended a short but very apt summation of the situation by Col. Blanco: «En el Rif, donde todos son personajes, sólo una política de masas y no de individuos puede ser fructífera» (15).

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In the Rif, up to the advent of ʿAbd al-Karīm, the state of war was so permanent that it can truthfully be said that if is customary for Europeans or Americans to declare war, it was also customary for the Riffians to declare peace. We must remember that the *thārfiqth* was the unit of vengeance, and that feuds between *thārfiqīn* even within the same village were a commonplace. House-to-house fighting was the order of they day. If a feud kept going long enough, the result was that the other *thārfiqīn* in the same and in nearby villages eventually began to group themselves around either one of the two feuding parties, usually with the one which was closer kin to themselves. Thus we have the beginnings of a moiety organization, equivalent to the *ṣof* of the Kabyles of Algeria. If the members of one moiety gradually found themselves on the losing side, their representatives used to lead a bull to the mosque of a neutral village or *thārfiqth* the aid of which they desired, and the *faqīh* slaughtered it on the sill so that its blood spurted over the threshold. The fact that a bull was sacrificed whenever possible is significant in itself, as the Wuryāghlīs [262] are very poor and largely vegetarians by force of circumstances; a bull is the most expensive edible animal they can buy. The act of sacrifice worked as a powerful shame compulsion *(ʿār)*, and forced the members of the second group into alliance with the first, whether they were willing or not. This type of alliance was called *liff*, as mentioned above, and as the feud grew in size, so did the *liff*. If the feud remained localized, alliances were usually made anew after it was over; but if it spread enough to involve whole «fifths», the traditional *liff* alignment of the two opposing moieties of Aith Yūsuf and Aith ʿAlī came into play again. The clever manipulation of this

(14) Coon, 1931, p,. 97.
(15) Blanco Izaga, 1939, p. 67.

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system of alliances which 'Abd al-Karīm displayed during the early part oh his war was one of the major reasons for his successful unification of the Rīf (16).

It must the stated here, however, that it was unusual for most feuds to become anything more than shootings on a local scale. First of all, feuding kept the population down; sescondly, house burnings and exaction of fines by the *imghāren* were harsh repressive measures in themselves; thirdly, the constant fear of outside invasion by the councillors of another tribe (which occurred wen the *imghāren* of Aith 'Ammarth stepped in on the side of Aith Yūsuf to end a feud between the latter and Aith 'Alī, plus the standard alignment of other «fifths», which had been going on for seven years) tended to restrict the scope of the feud and to prevent it from spreading; and fourthly, individuals who were considered habitual troublemakers and soreheads even by Riffian standards were exiled. If they refused to accept the dictum of the *imghāren* they were unceremoniously put to death.

The above is a reflection of the Riffian political system and situation which prevailed up until the time of 'Abd al-Karīm. The governmental structure of Aith Wuryāghil followed to the letter the true Berber pattern of superimposed representative councils, with a few of the members of each deliberative body being chosen to participate in the council of the group a rung higher up the ladder. Furthermre, thanks to the *liff* alliance system, as Blanco says, the individual in the *thārfīqth*, the *thārfīqth* in the *jamā'ath*, the *jamā'ath* in the «fifth», the «fifth» in the tribe *(thaqbīt*, pl. *thaqbīr*, from Arabic *qabīla*, pl. *qabā'il)*, and the tribe in relation to other tribes all maintain an unstable equilibrium, expressed in terms of the linking of *rubū'* or of «fifths», and ultimately, in the two great rival moieties of Ṣinhāja and Ghumāra (17). As it happens in our particular case, Aith Wuryāghil was (and is) too large and powerful to need formal alliances with other tribes, its only active ally having been Aith 'Ammarth, for, as many old greybeards have told me, «We could still go out and eat Tamsamān or Aith Tuzīn any day of the week»; but for small tribes surrounded by big neighbors, such as Thafarsīth,

(16) Coon, 1951, p. 317.
(17) Blanco Izaga, 1939, p. 70.

181 Moreover, even though many jural details of life during the
178 'Ripublik' have now been forgotten, many attitudes and values of
that era, which, as noted, lasted until the advent of 'Abd al-Krim
[421] in 1921, are still fully present. The Rifian keeps an iron grip on
[542] what belongs to him, and this applies particularly to his womenfolk,
who, albeit highly respected, are kept equally secluded and segre-
[423] gated. Also, his land, poor as it may be, is his own and no one
[628] else's, in true "territorial imperative" style. But especially with
554 the coming of the protectorate, the values underlying the bloodfeud,
464 which was once the dominant political institution of the society,
were channeled into the newer direction of labor migration: in the
old days of the 'Ripublik', a man had to kill his enemy to make his
[464] mark, while more recently he had to go out and get a job. (Until
1962 and Algerian Independence, work on the farms of French colons
in that country was the favored mode and region of labor migration,
while since that time the current has shifted to Western Europe.)

181 The Aith Waryaghar uprising against the Indepent Moroccan Govern-
669 ment in 1958-1959 - which was forcibly put down by the new Royal Army
in its first post-Independence test of strength - was a graphic in-
dication, at the tribal level, that the old values of Rifian "apart-
ness" within the wider national Moroccan society are still resistant
to change, for despite its "modern" objectives, the uprising itself
was carried out in a "traditional", "take-to-the-hills" manner. And
these same values are even more discernible, today as in Blanco's
621 time, at the level of the jma'th, the local community. Community life
671 among the Aith Waryaghar is both intense and inner-directed, as, for

613 a single dharfiqth may contribute to the formation of several jma'th-s.
614 even in different tribes. And thus the jma'th of Aith Waryaghar is
623 an agglomeration of dharfiqin without known relationship to each other.[63]

623 The iziddjifen have well-defined functions within the above
613 groups (e.g. jajgu and dharfiqth), such as the distribution of work,
[596] payment and benefits (barley to the fqih, rations to the poor, reception of guests, fines, irrigation turns, participation in communal property, etc.), and formation of the opinion which their delegate to the outside world has to express, as well as support for him in the viewpoints he is to maintain. The iziddjifen, as representative of the dharfiqin, are the primordial element in the "play" of the jma'th.

D) Position of Women:

562 182 171 A Kabyle can do what he likes with his wife except make her a corpse, while a Rifian considers her as precious coin in the cancellation of blood debts, and a Berber from the Atlas Mountains regards her as a precious offering in his request for an alliance[64], when the insecurity of the social grouping made it mandatory to look for friends to reinforce it.

562 627 628 The sad (Blanco's term) condition of women is most clearly revealed in reprisal and in the norms which regulate it, such as their devaluation, pre-Islamic in character (sic), revealed through the exemption from the act of vengeance of a husband who kills his wife;...North Africa is an area where women can be killed, and the blood-price (Arabic diya, Rifian ddiyith) is half that for a man.....

423 A curious feature of Rifian society is that the territorial limits of its social units are to a certain extent elastic. An individual or a family, for example, may acquire land in another tribe, and his or their own clan or tribe does not appropriate for itself the territory he occupied previously; this remains fixed. But when [628] the properties of an individual or a kin group which are modified are bordering each other, then the jma'th, clan or tribe, or rather, its area of extension or its areal jurisdiction, follows an analogous variation, improvement or cutting-off, increase or loss, advance or retreat, as the case may be; and such instances bring about not a few 423 quarrels and altercations. This happened in Ibuqquyen, whose people 619 saw their neighbors of Aith Waryaghar creeping into their territory through slowly buying up all the good land around the middle course of the Buham River, at which point they opposed selling them any more terrain...This territorial elasticity, although it does not bring about great modifications because of the incessant watch which the tribes instinctively keep over their land, also derives, no doubt, from the ancient family concept of opposition to everything which could weaken it; and, as a result, such land returns most often to its tribe of origin through abandonment, new acquisition or exchange, if it has been alienated. Such elasticity tends to become lessened (with [131] consequently greater rigidity of tribal boundaries) when it coincides with natural boundaries, as, for example, in the middle and upper courses of the Nkur River, separating the tribes of Axt Tuzin and Aith Waryaghar; but even so, this play of property has nevertheless modified tribal frontiers as well delineated as this one.

621 628 [681] [794] These jma'ths, the internal lives of which were regulated by the custom governing the original mountain jma'th, continued as tributaries of the latter[133], enjoying the benefits of such a status (participation in the collection of fines, contributions to the fqih)[134] until, as we have seen, the new nucleus, beginning to stand out more and more as a result of its growth, importance and distance from the parent jma'th, succeeded in emancipating itself from the latter through its own discords and ambitions.[135]

621 But it is difficult to determine at precisely what moment the new jma'th came of age, as it is to determining everything else, even including finding out the designations in nomenclature of its representatives. 621 192 This designation is not that of amin, as among the Kabyles of Algeria, a word which, taken over from Arabic, is one which does not permit a confusion of its administrative significance, an individual function, with that of the jma'th, which has a collective mqaddim, a term also adopted from Arabic and employed by certain Berber groups in the Western Atlas, for the personage of the mqaddim also has that function as well as the inadmission of that of the shaikh, which more than one person in Aith Waryaghar attributes to himself and which 621 figures even in documents. These terms, however, do not demonstrate any more than the anarchy which the people have attained, and the forgetting of their own racial (sic!) characteristics[136]; as such words among Rifians can have no meaning nor can they be given any importance greater than those of "colonel" and "doctor" in the South [646] American republics. These are strange nicknames (sic), for to the [182] Rifian, as to any Berber, they say nothing if they are to be considered

619 Thirmamin, Ifillasen, Asht r-Ahsin u Musa, Afarzaz and Tiyuririn.
614 Shaikh (1940): Muhammad Bu Thuyis.
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d) Clan ("fraction") of Asht Mhand: contains villages of Asht Bujtuh, Asht Tayyar and Asht Ziyan. Shaikh (1940): Muhammad n Ka'was.

e) Clan ("fraction") of Asht Yunis: contains villages of Azru, Asht Hazim, Thaghirasth, Ihadhriyen, r-'Arqub and Ikhabbaben.

f) Clan ("fraction") of Asht 'Aru 'Aisa: contains villages of Dwaiyar, Tighza, Jbil Sidi 'Aisa, Waunkwarth and Thinimrar. Shaikh (1940): 'Abd r-Qadar n Muhand Aqudhadh.

g) Clan ("fraction") of Asht 'Asim: one part contains villages of Ifran, Iqarru'an and Iharrasen; another, those of Buridh, Tamjund and Iharrushen; and the third, Inhanahan, Iharshriyen and Thara Tazzugwakhth. The shaikhs of each (1940): 'Abdallah n Zimbib, Muh n Mis'aud and Si Muh n Biqqish.

195 8) History:--There are no precise dates on the history of the Igzinnayen until the occupation of the tribe by the Pretender Bu Hmara. [628] It appears that prior to this time the tribe was consumed in intestinal [616] struggles between Ifuf, as all Berber and Arab tribes were. These were disputes without interest in which the fortune and existence of the protagonists and their people were at stake.

195 — When Bu Hmara (Jilali Zarhuni) occupied the country of the
554 Igzinnayen, he came to the qasba at Msun (in the Asht r-Udha), and afterwards he met with the subclans of the Asht Haddu and I'athmanen[171]. Useless resistance on the part of the latter was severely punished, and their two chiefs, the Hajj Hammada and the Fqih 'Abbu, brought to heel,

arranged in spatial terms. The correspondence between a territorial system and a lineage system is always approximate, and sometimes, even, very close indeed, but it is, for a variety of reasons, never quite complete.

16--"Group" is hardly the right word to give to an institution or a socio-cultural category; but one can see that it was well intended and that Blanco was groping in the right direction. In most instances in which his choice of terms is obviously wrong, we have tried to rectify this by the substitution of other words which seem more nearly to fit the context.

17--Imrabdhen, sing. amrabidh (from Arabic murabit) are saints, living or dead, who, in the mind of the average Rifian, are often confused with shurfa, or descendants of the Prophet. The role of imrabdhen or shurfa as moderators in intra- or inter-tribal disputes is, indeed, perhaps the primary one which they (or some of them, for there are many who are functionally completely indistinguishable from ordinary tribesmen) play in Rifian society.

18--The role of Jews in the Rif is indeed a primarily economic one--they are jewelers and pack-saddle makers, and their social status is (or was, as there are none left there today) the humblest in the area, for they never carried arms and were always under the protection of a clan or lineage headman who, if necessary, would defend them to the death. In short, they were and are despised, but their services were needed. But why Blanco mentions them, an ethnic group, in the same breath with a series of economic institutions is a bit difficult to fathom.

19--As noted, the Rif formed an integral part of the blad as-siba, and Blanco's conceptualization of Rifian society as representing an "organized anarchy" may easily, in the traditionalist frame of reference, be extended to cover the whole notion of siba. In another publication we have already set forth our views on the usual French definition of this term, which goes back to Montagne, of siba as "anarchy", a notion which seems to us, in the last analysis, invalid, implying as it does a complete lack of government (cf. David M. Hart, "Emilio Blanco Izaga and the Berbers of the Central Rif", Tamuda, VI, 2, 1958, pp. 171-237). More recently, however (and a point which we overlooked in the abovementioned article), there has been a certain modification by at least one French scholar of this traditionally accepted viewpoint--cf. André Adam, La Maison et le Village dans Quelques Tribus de l'Anti-Atlas, Collection Hesperis, vol. XIII, Paris: Larose, 1951, p. 30, and personal communication, 1959. This modification, in effect, concedes that anarchy within Berber society is an inapplicable term, but that it is still valid if the society is viewed from without, or from above, because the highest organizational or structural stage which Berbers have attained is that of the tribe only, never that of the nation-state. And if we read between the lines of Blanco's words, this, or something akin to it, is very probably what he had in mind when writing of "organized anarchy".

000 152--This is true, and as Coon indicates, it is probably a hall-mark of considerable antiquity. See Coon, op. cit., 1931, p. 19, for traditions of origin of the clans and subclans of the Igzinnayen, many of which conflict with those given by Blanco below.

153--True; but does this necessitate the employment of value judgments as to physical type and temperament?

154--According to our notes, the Dharwa Haddu are autochthonous to Igzinnayen.

155--According to Coon (op. cit., 1931, p. 105), many people of the dharfiqth of Asht 'Abd r-Mumin in the village of Iharrushen, of Asht 'Asim Proper, went to l-Mta as exiles after their feud with the Asht Tadmuth; the Hajj Biqqish, in fact, was a moving spirit in banishing them, as one of their members shot three of the Asht Tadmuth on the feast day of the 'Aid l-Khir. Perhaps poverty was also a factor in the move to l-Mta of members of other lineages in the Asht 'Asim.

156--Ishillahan: our notes state that their origin traditions are not from Andalusia, but from the Eastern Rifian tribe on the Aith Wurishik, which would accord better with their "Berber" name.

157--Ihadhriyen: our notes say that they have nothing to do with the Jbarna, other than that they are members of the same tribe.

158--Thaghirasth is autochthonous to the Igzinnayen, according to our notes.

159--Asht r-'Arqub: our notes contain no reference to Sidi 'Azzuz, in connection with the lineage.

160--Ikhabbaben: our notes contain no reference, regarding them, to Branis.

161--Asht Hazim: our notes, regarding them, contain no reference to Aith Iznasan.

162--To our knowledge they are all local lineages.

163--The Asht 'Aru 'Aisa are more properly descended from Sidi Ahmad, the son of Sidi Musa bin Mshish, and known as Sidi Hand u Musa. He is buried in Swaiyar, in the Asht 'Aru 'Aisa, while his father is buried in Jbil 'Alam of Bni 'Arus of the Jbala. Aru 'Aisa ('Ali u 'Aisa, or 'Ali bin 'Aisa) himself, the real apex of the lineage, is to be found some 11 generations later than Sidi Hand u Musa on the geneaology of these shurfa, whose authenticity is beyond question and is recognized in the right, which they exercise, to share in the annual proceeds of the box (sunduq) of Mulay Idris in Fez.

It is also said that 'Abd al-Krim was descended from the shurfa Sidi Hand u Musa of Asht 'Aru 'Aisa.

164--The Asht 'Asim and Imzdurar, each being the strongest representative of its respective liff, almost certainly formed the kernel of such a nucleus; but it seems to us that the Asht Yunis might be substituted for the Asht Marar, which is only a subclan of the Imzdurar.

was capable of facing the wrath of the members of a dharfiqth who thought themselves to have been wronged in a legal decision and who were now blocking his path?

The Rif is an area of warrior tulba; and the "poetry" of the Rifian Maghrib would have dealt with the firing of shots during the course of a feud or raqba[7] and the blood of victims whose bodies fall into canyons and gorges after sunset; for the qanun of the Tuesday market (now defunct) of the Aith 'Abd Allah clan establishes the validity of the agreement in question from the hours of dawn until dusk, on market day, after which time everyone shelters himself and his animals inside his house as fast as he can; and a guard is mounted with a rifle. The daily and weekly truce is over[7a]. And even in Spanish times, after the pacification, there is the story of the qadi who did not dare to return home unless accompanied by a pair of armed mkhazni-s[8], who represented the protection of the Makhzin in its most elementary form. And in the mahkama (tribunal building of qa'id or qadi), more than one qadi has been intimidated by exasperated litigants! If such things have happened during Spanish times, threats made during the "Republik" must have been far worse--"I'll hang you from a tree, mmis nj-haram!" or "I wonder what you'd look like without a head, mmis n-dhit!"[9]

As I see it, the Rifian follows the Shari'a in all instances in which customary law cannot help him, either because it has been forgotten or because in such and such a case it is no longer applied. As he is both a practical man and a believer, there is no reason for the Rifian to deny himself the advantages of the Shari'a, but when, instead of these, he encounters a situation which is prejudicial to him (such as

5: Blanco Izaga G-4,5 (1914-1945) 1975 MX3 Rif MX3
Aith Waryaghar

681 A murderer in the Rif had to stay in exile until such time as his
682 victim's family would consent to accept bloodmoney, and this generally
696 meant at least one or two years, by which time their desire to kill
him might have cooled down. If they were eventually persuaded to accept
[782] this sum, the murderer's own agnates, at home, went to them and, in the
presence of a holy man, sacrificed a goat to them. After the goat was
eaten, the terms of the ddiyith were discussed and arrived at; and only
after it was paid could the murderer return home. Furthermore, if he
682 had committed his crime on a market path or in the market itself, on
443 market day, as aforementioned, he had to pay an entirely different sum
[114] (which Blanco often confuses with the ddiyith), the rhaqq or market fine
(called r-insaf in the Eastern Rif), consisting of 1000 duros for murder
on a path leading to the market and 2000 duros for a murder or any other
offense grave enough to upset the peace of the market, in the market
itself. This fine was only levied on market day, and payable to the
imgharen of the market. (If a murder was committed away from a market
path or from the market on a day other than market day, there was no
question of fine-paying, which was instituted purely to keep peace in
the suq.) It could be paid in money and/or in kind, and it usually
meant that the murderer had to sell the bulk of his property to raise
the necessary sum, which he handed over at the same time as he did the
ddiyith; but if he could not or would not pay it (and it was a sum
which was prohibitively high), the imgharen descended on him in a body
and burned his house, trees and fields. In addition, many people re-
682 fused to accept the ddiyith, which meant permanent exile for the mur-
628 derer. The imgharen, however, could not touch his property as long as
he was in exile; though he was expected to pay in full if his victim's
family relented and let him return. However, a murderer whose opinion
of himself was so elevated (and there were many such in the Rif) that
he refused to flee, refused to pay the ddiyith to the dead man's ag-
nates and (perhaps worst of all) refused to pay the rhaqq to the
imgharen could expect no mercy; he was attacked by the enraged kinsmen
of his victim and by the council members whose authority he had flouted,
as well--and the feud was on. His own agnates, under these circum-
stances, if they helped him (as they always did) could also expect to
have their own houses and property burnt to cinders.

681 56--There was some variation for minor offenses, but the fines for
682 murder, always with the same careful stipulation of time and place of
commission (market path or market on market day) were absolutely stan-
dard throughout the Central Rifian area.

[671] 57--There is some disagreement on this question. In the qanun of the
[114] Aith 'Abd Allah, cited by Blanco in La Ley Rifeña (p. 47), it is ex-
pressly stated that if two people commit a murder on a path leading
to the market, each of them is fined 1000 duros. Our own informants,
[024] however, stated that the number of people participating in a murder is
immaterial; what counts is the number of dead, each one of whom is
[628] assessed at either 1000 or 2000 duros, always according to where the
murder took place, a head. In the same way, after a feud is over and
a truce has been arranged, the number of dead on each side are counted
up, and the side with the greater number receives excess ddiyith from

681 the side with the lesser. (This last piece of information comes from
682 some of the lowland clans of the Aith Waryaghar, and the highlanders
[628] of the same tribe deny it.)

000 58--The victim, if he is alive, receives the rqisas, and, if dead, his family gets the ddiyith--if they choose to accept it rather than take up their guns. It is barely possible that in the division of the rhaqq by the imgharen along segmentary lines, the victim's family might receive a tiny fraction of the total, although the chances are strongly against it. The rhaqq almost always goes into the pockets of the imgharen themselves, and when we say that it is divided along segmentary lines, what we mean is that it is the imgharen of each segment and subsegment, rather than the rank-and-file of either, who are the real beneficiaries.

However, this is not really the point, which, in any event, Blanco
[682] has missed entirely. The point is that a murderer pays bloodmoney to his victim's agnates and a fine to the council members (the latter only if the murder has taken place in the market or on a track leading to it).

[114] 59--Blanco is theoretically correct in saying that dharfiqin distribute their share of the fine to the nubath making them up (although in practice this almost never occurs, as the money which filters down, through the normal process of division, goes no further than the lineage heads!); but it is surprising that he does not start at the top levels of segmentation, the clans, as the imgharen themselves did, and work down from there (though even at this level the imgharen tended in practice to pocket the fines).

[114] 60--In this term, el poder ejecutivo, once again, we have a formalistic European notion, which, though certainly accurate in one sense, nonetheless ill befits the essential informality of the tribal council members who convened in the market to discuss the week's happenings and to assess, equally informally, any cases which came to them.

61--It may be stated categorically that such Qur'anically-inspired punishments as putting out a thief's eyes were completely unknown in the Rif and in the rest of Berber Morocco.

[839] 62--Though it is probably of frequent occurrence elsewhere, bestiality
[838] is not common in the Rif, and those who do practice it are always the object of derision. Furthermore, the Rif is probably one of the few regions of Morocco where homosexuality is nonexistent.

[113] 63--These notes of Blanco's on hunting are extremely fragmentary; for fuller information on Rifian hunting practices, see the final chapter in La Ley Rifeña on the hunting qanun or qanun r-rayah, as well as a recent summary of the same material in R. P. Esteban Ibáñez, "El Derecho Consuetudinario en la Sociedad Bereber", Institut International de Sociologie, XVIIIe Congrès, Nuremberg, 16-17 September 1958 (mimeographed). Our own impression of Blanco's data on hunting is that
[114] although very complete, his description is at the same time unnecessarily complex.

64--In the Jbil of the Aith Waryaghar, hunting may take place on any day of the week.

634 If the matter is one of
623 imposition of a fine, the deliberations are rendered longer, through
614 haggling, and more methodical, because in such an instance custom
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692 decrees that half of it (i.e. the fine) goes to those who impose it,
681 the chiefs within the small circle, and the other half, to the injured parties and their kinsmen (the sector, or the whole big outside circle).[2 & 3]

1) War:

634 a) Declaration:--War surges up frequently from agraw meet-
619 ings; at times, a meeting terminates in rifle shots. This may not be
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623 a very politic declaration, but, equally, it is not a very rare one.
628 ....Ordinarily, the separation and departure of those who have come
721 together and convened at a council meeting without having arrived at any agreement is considered tantamount to a declaration of war, which all the threatening components hastily retire in order to prepare.... Only the later intervention of new emissaries can put off hostilities. This in itself is uncommon, because from the moment the meeting is theoretically over, disputes and quarrels begin in fact, and the life expectancy of such emissaries would thus become extremely slight.

628 b) Fighting:--Usually the plan of attack is instinctive,
721 logical and clear to all: the accusers, being warned and prepared beforehand, are the attackers and take the offensive, while the accused,
624 surprised by the result, are on the defensive. No war chiefs have been previously appointed. The objective is clear and simple for every combatant, namely, to exterminate the opposite group and take over its property. Very soon combat parties are drawn up, through reasons of kinship, friendship and geographical proximity; at night,

628 721 they send out a couple of individuals to care for their relatives (in their absence) and tell them what has happened, and by day, they have to feed them, after which, once this is done, they start the march toward the enemy group in order to deliver the coup de main either at once or through careful skirmishing.

There is no top command, for, as the objective is clear, it is not needed. All that must be done is to write finis to the enemy. Individual desertion is shameful, booty is eagerly anticipated, and members of the war-party do not worry about the fact that there are neither rearguard services nor defense.

B) Harkas and their Formation (fragmentary):

[701] [626] [689] The obligation to serve in a harka or war-party was general and accepted by all, and avoidance of harka duty was an object of censure and sanction. Any and all groups which were threatened (both internally and externally) provided variable contingents which were activated periodically. Until protectorate times, punitive expeditions organized by the Moroccan Sultans to chastise recalcitrant tribesmen were augmented by auxiliary harkas made up from the tribes through [648] whose territory the expeditions passed. A good example was the foray undertaken by Bushta al-Baghdadi, one of the fin de siècle commanders of the Moroccan army, against the pirates of the Ibuqquyen in 1898[4]. 701 More recently, 'Abd al-Krim solicited harkas for individual engagements; he maintained a reduced contingent, which was periodically increased, under arms. The system was one of partial mobilization with relief contingents, the number and amount of which were fixed by 'Abd al-Krim. Their recruitment and provisions were handled by their

726 strength of those who were first on the spot, and so that the points which were most threatened could be easily and quickly reinforced. [182] [701] The dissemination of contingents was imposed by geographical factors (i.e. by the extreme poverty of an area which is excessively compartmented and rought country), by political ones (i.e. lack of a single head at the top of the chain of command other than individuals of purely local prestige, and a recruitment system which set limits on the employment of large units) and even by technical ones (i.e. the European notion of reducing the defense of fixed points of strategic interest, as well as in finding them, is difficult for Rifians to assimilate, for they themselves merely wait in their hilltop houses, etc.)[8].

C) Rifian Alliances (fragmentary):

619 628 181 [602] The Rif was a mosaic of independent tribes, gnawed at by internal disputes in an inhospitable land. It was a powder-keg of individual personalities who placated misfortunes with more misfortunes, with misery, envy and egotism; each one of these men were followed by minuscule groups of kinsmen and partisans, with no tie greater to oppose an invader than their own ambition and convenience....

619 There was in the Rif, however, a certain internal equilibrium by which small tribes like the Targist, Thafarsith and Aith Wurishik[9] could persist, even though surrounded by powerful neighbors.

619 616 [648] Alliances seem the logical and necessary step to which the Rifians had recourse when threatened by superior powers, such as that of the Sultans. The main significance of alliances lies in defense against a common danger, as well as in its concomitant, mutual aid;

616 The jma'th, the clan and the tribe, in spite of swamping
614 their territory with the blood of their brothers and fellow members,
619 are invariably and unchangingly preserved, for the desire of expansion
[621] on the part of their neighbors was always held in check by a tremendous fear of the liff, whose mysterious strength was never known previously[25]....And here we have a strange game or interplay between these
616 182 628 two types of liff, for while the individual type, with its sanguinary feuds with neighbors, tends toward the disintegration of the social units involved, the general type remains permanent and intact, tending to neutralize or localize the hatreds which the quarrels of the individual type can engender.[26]

618 692 616 182 As today (1935) the central power (i.e. the Spanish Protectorate or Makhzin) is strong enough to put individual and group disputes up to arbitration, guaranteeing the enjoyment of his or their rights to each person or group involved, the general liffs are disappearing and the individual ones are weakening; but in my opinion, if any real commotion began, liff alliances would surge up anew, even though today they exist largely in the minds of old men.[27]

616 Robert Montagne, in Les Berbères et le Makhzen (p. 216), says of all this:

> "When we study the existence of little elementary societies, we are struck both by the tyranny exercised by the group over the individual and by the impotence of the former to keep away from anarchy. The liffs materialize and project on ground level, we might say, the two opposite and complementary tendencies of Berber life: the spirit of association and the taste for discord."

My own feeling on the matter, however, is that the liff system is the complement of the other two types of unity, family and kin group

or similar agglomerates. This might also perhaps explain the persistence in disorder up to exhaustion point, for thanks to an obscure family feud, a chain reaction would unleash violence throughout the whole region as fast as a burning cigarette can produce a forest fire[35].

There is no doubt that through their origins the tribes can be classified into two great groups, Sanhaja and Ghumara, which formed the two great Rifian alliances of the same names, and between which the Rifian tribes were distributed in an apparent equilibrium, as follows[36]:

Ghumara: Ibuqquyen, Aith Yittuft, Aith 'Ammarth, Mtiwa dyal Bhar (Mtiwa of the Sea), Ghmara Proper (Bni Rzin, Bni Khalid, Bni Silman, Bni Zjil, Bni Buzra, Bni Mansur, Bni Grir, Bni Smih and Bni Ziyat), Bni S'aid (of the Jbala, not the Rifian tribe of Aith S'aid), Bni Zarwal, Bni Zarwal, Bni Winjil, Slas, Hiyaina, Branis, Igzinnayen[37], Marnisa, Mtiwa dyal Uta (Mtiwa of the Plain), Bni Mstara and Ghzawa.

Sanhaja: Bni Bu Frah, Bni Gmil, Mistasa[38], Aith Waryaghar, l-Khmas, Bni Waryagil[39], Jaya, Mzzyat, Rgiwa, Dsul, Rhuna, and Sanhaja Srir (Ktama, Aith Siddat, Aith Khannus, Taghzut, Aith Hmid, Aith Bshir, Aith Bu Nsar and Bni Bu Shibt).

However, it seems somewhat limited to attribute the basis of Rifian political preferences and the reason for alliances in the region to this dim and garbled tradition of the very distant past[40]. If, on the other hand, the form of government or religion were in dispute, it would be easier to explain its affinities to the European type[44]. Furthermore, if we discard as vaguely traditional such causes of union

A,[This should read "41" not "44"--Analyst]

000 FOOTNOTES:

(114) 1--This should no doubt read, "by iziddjifen or imgharen".

(682) 2--We have not heard of any instance in which a tribal fine is divided up in this manner. Normally, when a man is fined for murder, for instance, the fine is split up into as many equal parts as there are clans in the tribe, after which each clan distributes its share of the fine among its component subclans, and so on down the line.

3--For an excellent and virtually contemporary account of what could happen at an agraw, see Coon, op. cit., 1931, p. 97, and Coon, Flesh of the Wild Ox, New York: Morrow, 1932, pp. 77-83. Coon's account is taken from the Igzinnayen, who pronounce the word ayraw.

(628) (114) 4--This is indeed an excellent example, but Blanco does not say why: because the other Rifian tribes through which Bushta al-Baghdadi's army passed did their own share of pillaging the Ibuqquyen as well--and this was particularly true of the lowlanders of the Aith Waryaghar.

5--The term harka did not exist in the Rif prior to 'Abd al-Krim, and under his aegis the notion it implied reached its fullest flowering, through military (i.e. "regular" Rifian Army, a total of some 2500 men under the command of 'Abd al-Krim's younger brother Si Mhammad n Si 'Abd l-Krim) and ordinary tribal levies sent out to fight, first, the Spaniards on two fronts (east and west) and then the French on one (south). These contingents, both regular and irregular, were organized into groups of twelve, twenty-five, fifty, one hundred and three hundred men (the last mentioned constituting a tabur), each one of which was under a qa'id designated by the number of men under his command--qa'id at-tn'ash (of 12), qa'id l-khamsa w 'ashrin (of 25), qa'id l-khamsin (of 50), qa'id l-Miya (of 100), and qa'id attabur (of a tabur, or 300).

(171) However, the idea of the harka had been there previously, even if the organizational refinements set up by 'Abd al-Krim, who modeled them on those of the Sultan's Army, were new.

6--In actual fact, those imgharen already holding office merely became war leaders as well.

(602) 7--This statement does not quite jibe with the notion of conscription, above; but the principle was exactly the same as that of a powerful chief who could count on armed support from numerous lineage-mates and/or fellow clansmen.

8--This comparison is couched by Blanco in the form of a recommendation for the use of native harkas in Spanish service.

(114) 9--This is certainly true of the Targist and the Thafarsith, but not of the Aith Wurishik, who are a fairly powerful tribe in their own right.

10--In the original, todo el mundillo rifeño, which is fully as descriptive, and a good deal less pompous, than "conceptual universe", for example.

616 619 642 114 11--Berber society always seems to be labeled "republican", "democratic", "anarchic", "oligarchic", etc. etc., and as I have remarked in several previous notes, Blanco is a prime offender in this regard. Even though

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last analysis, is with her husband, although the relationship between idhuran (sing. adhuggwar) or in-laws is always conceptualized in terms of mutual help, friendship and obligation, in short, of alliance.

25--What is presumably meant here is that one is never sure if one's allies of yesterday will be one's enemies of tomorrow.

26--Blanco recognizes the shifting character of liffs on lower levels of segmentation and the relative permanence of those on higher levels, and it is certainly true that in one sense the permanent liffs act as checks and balances on those of the lower levels. However, what Blanco [114] does not say is that this cuts both ways; and in a critique of Montagne's ideas on the subject, Andre Adam (La Maison et le Village dans [113] Quelques Tribus de l'Anti-Atlas, Collection Hesperis, XIII, Paris: Larose, 1951, p. 41) raises the question of whether liffs cause war or prevent it, saying in effect that if their function was to prevent it, they hardly succeeded!

27--This point, again, is well taken. Liffs, in theory, do not exist today, and even though the liff structure is largely erased from the minds of Rifians of the younger generation, it could probably be reactivated without difficulty if the need arose, although such reactivation would doubtless take different and more modern forms. Hatreds in [152] the Rif today are latent; but every Rifian is perfectly aware who his [628] friends and who his enemies are, both within his own tribe and outside it.

28--The European concept of "republic", rather than the Rifian Republik, probably is the context which Blanco intended in this case, even though the latter makes far better sense!

29--It is not so much a difference as a shift in emphasis, as the Rifian proverb quoted in note 18 makes so abundantly clear.

619 30--If this statement is at the same time supposed to give any idea of
616 the primary divisions or maximal segmentation of the Aith Waryghar into
114 five khmas, it is highly misleading. From certain of his previous assertions, it seems that Blanco does indeed recognize the difference between a segmentary system and a liff system, but he does not bother to make this difference explicit anywhere. In addition, he faithfully lists the member clans and subclans of Moiety A, but merely refers to Moiety B as "the rest". To clarify the matter further, it should be
619 said that the Aith Waryaghar are segmented into five "fifths", or khams
616 khmās (sing. dhakhammasth; the notion of "five fifths" in addition indicates that a tribe is strong), as follows: I) Aith Yusif w 'Ari and
614 Aith 'Ari; II) Aith 'Abd Allah; III) Aith Hadhifa; IV) Aith Bu 'Ayyash, containing the subclans of Aith Bu 'Ayyash "Proper" (as it were) and Aith 'Adhiya (as we shall see Aith Bu 'Ayyash Proper was in the numerically superior liff, as was Aith Yusif w 'Ari, while Aith 'Adhiya and Aith 'Ari were in the smaller liff--thus the first two clans or subclans might be considered onomastically "dominant" and the second two onomastically "recessive", to borrow a term from Mendelian genetics); and V) Imrabdhen. To set the record completely straight regarding references in previous notes, and to attempt to tie up loose ends, the mountain, or Jbil, (sub)clans of Aith Turirth, Timarzga and

5: Blanco Izaga G-4,5 (1914-1945) 1975 MX3 Rif MX3
Aith Waryaghar

2. THE INTER-LINEAGE PACT[9] (AITH WARYAGHAR):

A) Qanun:

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[796]

Praise be to God...With the prolongation and extenuation of fire and discord between the sons of the celebrated saint Sidi 'Amar Bu Yawryan al-Yusifi al-Jilmami al-Ghalbzuri[10] of the subsegment (lit. farqa) of the Awlad Ukidar, and of that of the Awlad bin 'Abdallah, with the subsegment of al-'Aziz bin Muhammad, their allies, their partisans among the Awlad Tahir Asrih al-Hishami, their patrilateral cousin the Murabit Sayyid Muhammad bin al-Hajj 'Amar and their brother's sons supporting him, an intercession was initiated between both parties through which they desired to obtain the recompense of God by means of good acts, asking the two parties to incline toward reconciliation, which God qualifies by good work and promises to reward whomsoever puts it into practice; then they decided to initiate it for the space of one year from the present date until the same date of the following year.

In consequence, the first party, composed of the Faqih Muahammad Ashahbar Ukidar, his brothers by his father, his patrilateral cousins the Awlad bin 'Abdallah, such as his brother's son Hammu bin 'Abdallah, etc., appeared for judgment; after this, the second party, consisting of al-'Aziz bin Muhammad, his father's brother Akuh, the patrilateral cousin of both the aforementioned, the Siyyid Muhammad bin al-Hajj 'Amar, his brother's son and those of his party as well as those supporting the aforementioned second party of the subclan of Isrihan, the Awlad Tahir Asrich, such as Muhammad bin 'Aisa bin Tahir and all his patrilateral cousins, also appeared for judgment; they came to

671 agree to the abovementioned truce for one year starting from the present
628 date. All of them appeared for judgment in front of the shiyukh of the
613 Wednesday Market (Suq al-Arba') which exists in the vicinity of Sidi
728 Abu al-'Afif; attendance at this act was completely general, as there
[443] also came notables such as the blessed, distinguished and excellent
[686] sharif Sidi Ahmad the son of the celebrated saint Sidi Misa'ud, from whose grace God has let us avail ourselves; al-Hajj Haddu bin Tahir al-'Abbasi; the shiyukh of Ajdir; the shiyukh of the Murabitin al-Jilmamiyin; and all in general, each of the parties arranging that in case either of them should break off the aforementioned truce in any way before the stipulated time of one year has elapsed, it shall pay a fine of 2000 duros (i.e. 20 x 100) to the shiyukh.

671 After responding with their goods and estates to the completed
628 arrangement, it was put into effect in the presence of the aforemen-
613 tioned shiyukh in the latters' shop in the aforementioned market; and it was accepted in full and in good faith, with neither party having the right to retract in either the present or the future, each one of them making itself responsible for the fulfillment of what has been set down and for which only those mentioned here have the responsibility.

(The obligation to) payment (of the fine) and the agreement are both complete, as indicated. (The undersigned witnesses) have testified to the testimonial capacity of everyone concerned, that on this day, in the interior of the aforementioned shop, each person concerned, among those known by sight and name, is of sound mind and memory and thus
[805] capable of testifying. On the first Wednesday of Rabi' al-Awwal of the Prophet, in the year 1335 (December 27, 1916).[11]

B) Commentary:

671 182 We have here a curious (sic) type of qanun, which, as we read it, reveals the decomposition which Rifian society had reached, the atomism to which its tribal anarchy led, the imperfection, or rather, the inefficacy, of its laws, the irregular coexistence, the demonstration of its independence.

628 613 728 The disputes between two lineages of the Aith Waryaghar threaten to exterminate them through the chain of blood-vengeance in the face of the indifferent attitude of their constituents, who are habituated to taking justice into their own hands in order to defend their own interests. Two rival groups of equal size attain, in their ferocious and persistent struggle, an equal number of losses, and they reach a stage of weariness, a moment of lassitude happily exploited in order to initiate a treaty of peace (author's italics), which will permit them to build up their resources; and this fact leads them to establish this agreement for one year. Those who will (686) see to it that the truce is kept are the shiyukh, to whose protection they submit and who are interested in the affair because of the inducement of the fine which the group must pay, if within this minimal space of time it contravenes what has been agreed upon in any way (author's italics).

671 613 628 728 554 This society lacks a strong executive power; it looked instinctively toward the web of lineages represented through its shiyukh or old chiefs (sic) (no one should believe that this title represented a step in any framework of governmental or judicial power) for a force which was neutral to its feuds and more powerful than itself, to which

671 613 628 728 554 by such a simple and voluntary act it was converted at the same time to an arbiter of incidents and an executor of decisions. The function is not gratuitous as in modern states, for if in the latter the contributor pays indirectly, he does so directly in the Rif. Their covetousness thus awakened, they evidently insured temporarily against feud renewal, but they also stipulated that it would revive the embers of their hatred.

671 613 628 182 [183] These agreements or inter-lineage truces obeyed a double mechanism originating from the vicious circle in which they were debated. On the one hand they originated a series of regulatory norms of coexistence which, gaining in amplitude of concept and extending their jurisdiction to the generalizing of their advantages and the persistence of their exemplarity, painfully came to gain the adhesion of other nearby and related lineages until they were adopted by larger social and territorial units, including districts or entire tribes; and this situation gave rise to some of those qanuns upon which we will comment further on. On the other hand, they represented the ultimate [728] step to which anarchy led, responding to those most curious periods of [195] their history in which one powerful group, having recourse to violence, broke the truce in defense of its own interests, the official recognition of this fact being given by the imgharen in the suq in the face of general consternation, with the tragic phrase War dha bu r-haqq.[12]

628 602 182 195 "Now there is no law"[13]: such was the official form of declaring the state of anarchy into which the Rifians so frequently fell, a phrase which obliged them to strengthen their kin group, without dismay and by all means in their power; for a man's kinsmen were his last refuge in case of social accident.

5: Blanco Izaga G-4,5 (1914-1945) 1975 MX3 Rif MX3
Aith Waryaghar

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628 "Now there is no law" was repeated in the humble dwellings perched upon the heights; and soon the Rifian mountains regained their harsh, untranquil and agitated life, the bloody phantasmagoria of vengeance spreading again over the slopes through the cries of victims and the echo of gunshots.

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134 But the instinct of self-preservation again prevailed, first with pacts like the above, allying small lineages, and afterwards with pacts which, as will be shown later, forced whole tribes into more or less long pauses, during which they took a breathing spell in their rude and savage struggle for existence, which was complicated to an extraordinary degree by a poor and ungrateful soil.

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182 The reader will appreciate the importance which the market has in Rifian society, for it is not just a simple place of weekly commerce.....

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(648) The market in Rifian society is the preferential institution, the role of which, in my opinion, has today (1939) been partly absorbed by the Office of Native Affairs[14] and by the mahkamas or tribunals where the law can be laughed at much more easily than it can be in the market, under a carob tree in full view of all, the market to which the Rifians are so addicted and about which the qudat (pl. of qadi) are so refractory, the market which is today free of all control, including that of its constituents, the most efficacious control of all.[15]

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671 That the market, among Rifians, was the temple of law, of Parliament....is proven by the fact that in all markets laws were made through pacts, referenda and proclamations; and these unfortunately lack sanction through official publication. In it public affairs of general

671 interest were discussed; in the suq resolutions of more importance were
[443] made by significant individuals, more important than the place which gave them a legal character.

Thus, in order to be valid, agreements and decisions had to conform to the following conditions: 1) agreement of the imgharen[16]; 2) necessity of a witness of exceptional character (a personality of religious significance, known and respected throughout the district); 3) registry by the tulba; and 4) proclamation in the suq. The above seems to be the mechanism of Rifian law.[17]

443 And in the suq a double character may be seen: place of business
671 and temple of law, the latter more important than the former, because
614 if it were the other way around, each clan would have various market sites and not just one, it seems to us; and furthermore, some clans, by virtue of their commercial topography would have been lacking in markets, which is also not the case.[18] Thus we believe, as stated in the first part of this work[19], that there is a correspondence between the clan as a social unit and the suq; in fact, we may go so far as to say that the former was the real fatherland (patria) of the Rifian, his political unit, a small independent republic, the distinctive feature of which was the suq, the temple of Rifian law.

3. INTER-LINEAGE QANUN,[20] SHOWING EXECUTIVE PROCEDURE (AITH WARYAGHAR):

671 A) Qanun:
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613 Praise be to God.--Copy taken from the text of a document after legalization, extended for the bearer of some.

[682] Praise be to God.--Upon the reciprocal guarantee (Blanco: note 1) made by Ait 'Aisa, Ait Tzurakhth, Izubu'an, Ait Haddu u Sa'id and

5: Blanco Izaga G-4,5 (1914-1945) 1975 MX3 Rif MX3
Aith Waryaghar

671 Isaghwan[21] with (the) Awlad Siddiq[22], in the Wednesday Market (Suq
628 al-Arba') of Tawrirt, in the presence of their notables (Blanco:
613 note 2), agreeing there (to fulfill what has been pacted among them)
682 that anyone who should kill another by treachery or cunning (Blanco: note 3) shall pay a great fine, the amount of which (may) be as high as 4000 duros. This was also agreed to in their Saturday Market (Suq al-Sabt) in front of the notaries of both parties.

On the betrayal and killing (Blanco: note 4) by the above-mentioned Awlad Siddiq of Shu'aib bin al-Hajj 'Amar, the notables of both the abovementioned markets, accompanied by the rest of the people, went to their villages to look for them, camping there until the latter paid (Blanco: note 6), although they (e.g. the Awlad Siddiq) had agreed to this in their presence and in their abovementioned market (when the agreement took place) with respect to the fine expressed above (Blanco: note 7). Upon not finding any solution which would save them except that of handing over to them all their lands, both in the mountains and in Ait 'Aisa, their houses and their documents (Blanco: note 8), with which they remained free of the pressure which the notables and the rest of the people exercised over them (they opted for surrender).

[792] Then, everything which they handed over was valued at 1300 duros (Blanco: note 9) and after the estimate was made, the notables of both markets, including (Blanco: note 10) the sharif Sidi Ahmad bin Sidi al-Hajj Misa'ud[23], al-Hajj bin al-Hajj Am'awsh al-Tawrirti, 'Allal bin Haddu bin al-Hashimi u l-Fari (of the Axt Tuzin), Haddu bin Muhammad Amzyan al-Bu Khalafi[24], al-Talib al-Bukhamad al-Yunusi, Tuhami bin

671 al-Faqir Siddiq al-'Arusi, Muhammad ibn Tahra, Sidi Musa ibn al-Hajj
628 Sayyid 'Amar Tahtahi, Muhammad bin Bu Hammud Mulaidi; al-Hajj Sidi
613 Misa'ud al-Manduri; Sa'id bin al-Hajj Haddu al-Ufari, Muhammad bin
682 al-Faqir Muhammad bin al-Hajj Ahmad al-Barzi, Muhammad Bu Shu'an, and
[792] the rest of the notables of Tzurakhth (Blanco: note 11) sold all that was handed over to them to the brothers of the murdered man for the above sum, converting it into money.

(Blanco: note 12) The amount stated above was levied and the quantity (literally, price) was divided into four parts: 300 duros for the lineage of Izzugwaghen; the same for the Awlad al-Hajj 'Amar; the same for the Awlad Muhammad bin Muh bin al-Hajj Muhammadi al-Tazurakhti; and 150 duros for the Awlad Ahmad bin Taimunt (to be split) with Muhammad bin Tah, and the same for Muhammad bin Taimunt bin Misa'ud (to be split) with the Awlad Hammu Kabghith. One hundred (100) duros were divided in half between the son of Bukhalif, that is, Siddiq, and 'Abd al-Qadir Hashsha'.

(Blanco: note 13) Each of the abovementioned parties shall divide with its brothers (i.e. those of the same jurisdiction) the amount which it has exacted and with regard to the quantity of the same.

671 An irrevocable and non-retractable sale, effected (Blanco:
628 note 14) for repression and exemplary punishment. The sellers having
613 levied the total of the abovementioned sum, in the upper part of the
681 present qanun, from the hands of the buyers cited above, thus liberating
432 the sellers from all actions or reclamation regarding this matter and the above-cited buyer thus occupying (the lands) instead of the sellers, as his share. That is to say, occupying the place of the owner in the land, of the land which he buys and that of the owner of immovable

property in that belonging to him, in conformance with traditional law.[25]

Those who attended the present (act) brought their testimony to the above according to the requirements of the interested parties. --In the middle of Jumad al-Awwal of the year 1336 (February 27, 1918). --The 'adl, Muhammad bin Muhammad bin al-Hajj al-Warnuri.--Another, whose name is not known.--Another, Muhammad bin Sidi 'Abd al-Qadir al-Ghamri.

B) Commentary:

The social disintegration which Rifian society has reached is proven by these individual agreements between dharfiqin (Blanco: note 1, corresponding to text of qanun). In the face of helplessness or irregular functioning of higher-level associations, the poor tribesmen, before falling into complete anarchy, hastened to conclude an agreement with a neighboring group in order to attenuate that anarchy, succeeding in the hard struggle for life on a poor soil. These agreements thus formed true islets of irregular and variable peace, anchored in functional (sic) anarchy.

The necessity of agreements between lower-level lineages, who were abandoned by the rudimentary organization, obeyed, according to my understanding, those most curious periods which followed the public declaration of anarchy in the suq, when one powerful group managed by force to sustain the punishment, breaking the truce.

As the dispute was generalized between two preponderant rivals, the unaffected groups, before falling into anarchy, and with that notable instinct of self-defense, worked to bring about these agreements,

628 a guarantee of peace which, little by little, by virtue of their
613 acceptance by new and neighboring dharfiqin, came to be converted into
728 a general agreement between clans, thus increasing the radius of
614 peace; or they even inspired them to adhere once more to an interrupted truce.

628 "There is no law", the imgharen announced through the mouth of
616 the market crier, and the poor tribesmen, loading their faithful and
[195] inseparable companions, their rifles, were pressured into forming the
[203] ranks of a liff, and into working out guarantees or neighboring alliances, such as that which we shall examine, which, for greater efficacy, publicity and solemnity, they proclaimed in front of their notables in the suq (parliament--sic), rendering them necessary and valid for fulfillment (Blanco: note 2, in text).

671 These agreements had no other legal connotation than the very
628 short one of holding off the next spark of vengeance, being disrupted
728 or broken, due to the good will of trying to serve (Blanco: note 14) for repression and as an example of punishment, their efficacy being that of lengthening the brief periods of peace.

829 This is a rational mechanism. Everybody understood that war
721 would exterminate him; everybody desired to be at peace. But in their
[182] independent-minded democracy, they did not hit the mark with an organ of enforcement capable of imposing it, if anyone tried to disturb it.

671 Tired of tragic bloodfeuding, they drew up a truce and, logi-
628 cally, nominated the most powerful (man) to guarantee it and watch
728 over it.

671 628 613 728 Things went well, while the violators of the past were humble figures among the allied groups, incapacitated by their slight strength and the fact that they had few friends to abuse the pact by opposing themselves to other groups concerned; but when the equilibrium was upset or broken by the hatreds of the more distinguished lineage members, dragging their powerful lineages into the fray, the pact was wrecked and peace disappeared anew.

671 628 728 Observe in note 1 the guarantee of peace. In note 2, the formality of the agreement obtained. In note 3, the punishment. In note 4, the violation of the agreement. In note 5, the executive organ, the mass of the population. In note 6, the procedure. In note 7, the reason for the punishment, because it is a voluntary law. In notes 8 and 9, the fulfillment. In notes 10 and 11, the notables, the really significant personages, the Aitharbi'in. In notes 12 and and 13, with economic details, the democratic sensation of defective practice. In note 14, the Rifian illusion.

671 628 152 Notes 3 and 4 seem to show that Rifian custom is not designed to punish the loyal combatant, who, in an inflamed dispute, comes impulsively to make use of arms, incapable of dominating his instincts and always quick to defend his rights, but also to avoid treachery, cunning and hatred, or rather, vengeance, reprisal, from which the Rifians did not know how to free themselves, and which used up men and families. This is a notion which renders honors to manhood and stigmatizes the coward.

554 671 In notes 2, 10 and 11 it may be seen who the Rifians of significance are and that only these men, and not the ordinary tribesmen, are the executives and legislators. This proves what has been said

This proves what has been said
554 regarding the treatment of social organization in connection with the
671 ascendency and distinctiveness of the clans, of the suq, a true par-
614 liament, which is attended by the most outstanding men of the clan,
62 tacit or vocal delegates of the jma'ths who form an arictocracy known
623 as the Aitharbi'in, whose circumstantial attendance in some cases
619 forms the agraw, the directing assembly and organism of the tribe.
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614 This also serves to confirm our opinion that in the Rifian
671 area it is not the tribe which legislates and executes, but the clan,
[619] through its leaders, who parley in the market. It is thus the clan
[554] and its representatives in which all powers are concentrated and only
in case of a decrease in strength do they pay heed to the rest. The
Rifian clan is thus a truly autonomous state. It makes the law and
[681] executes it. Look, for instance, at the division of the fine, how
not a single céntimo goes to the representatives of other clans, even
if they are of the same tribe.

681 Notes 11, 12 and 13, which deal with the division of the fine,
[628] prove many of these notions. The victim or his family does not benefit
from it, for from the beginning his business is individual; a member
of his family (i.e. one of his agnates) will already be designated to
671 avenge him. The law does not punish more than the violation of the
pact, indemnifying those who remain faithful to such violation and saw
628 to its fulfillment. For this reason the perpetrator and his family
[672] (agnates) are punished, while all those who intervene in the service
of justice benefit, for they or their representatives carry it out.
If they get no money, as such, for such services, nobody would be
interested, for in carrying them out, he would not be bothered to

628 pick up his rifle in defense of justice (a few days of visiting, free food, participation in the sharing of the fines, and even a raid, if this be the case). In the latter instance, everyone was (translator's italics) interested and desired to see justice done (with concomitant benefits of a meal and collecting one's own share of the fine).

671 Rifian law, according to note 7, is definitely superior (sic) to European law, because it obliges anyone who submits to it only to accept it and to agree to its fulfillment, accepting beforehand the santions which it establishes.

671 554 794 212 It is in these qanuns that Rifians may see sharply reflected who exactly are the men of prestige in the group to which they attach themselves and even the order of preference, by means of the names which figure in them; but we must not lose sight of the fact that they are edited by tulba of childish mentality (sic), a mentality deformed by their Islamic education; and that these tulba do not even translate Berber conceptualizations into their Arabic writing, as may be observed in other qanuns, thus altering the natural order in favor of their religious inclinations.[26]

578 794 212 671 Nobody believes, then, that such individuals cited in the first place figure in the documents for reasons of religiosity, but for the convenience of the ingharen who, jealous of their prestige, would have promoted interminable altercations in order to be first, in their jealous egalitarianism, and the necessity, which they saw themselves in order to avoid it, of putting above their disputes and petty jealousies individuals of neutral appearance, such as tulba, to officiate as the pacifying presidents of their stormy council-meetings (igrawn).

671 It may also be seen that here there appear no Arabic names of tribal functionaries, such as qa'id, qadi or mqaddim.

[693] The notaries who sign the documents limit themselves, then, to the registry of acts passed by the lay committee or customary tribunal.[27]

This procedure clarifies the executive procedure in notes 5, 6, 7 and 8.

627 The notables and a coterie of friends, family or volunteers,
613 or, simply, hungry men, fall like locusts upon the households of the lineage-mates (agnates) of the accused, and they do not budge until the matter is settled; either this, or they throw them out of doors.[28] Documents and lands, proofs and possessions; the accused's agnates must hand over all of these, as well as their very houses. They have violated the pact and the pledged word. They can only save their own [628] persons, and this with difficulty, thanks to the force of vengeance, bloodfeud and reprisal, to the raqba[29], which may be taken by any member of the victim's family (i.e. any of the victim's agnates).

627 It is a rapid procedure, but not because the law or its executive organs are rapid, for, as among Europeans, as it is their own flesh which suffers, they are in no great hurry. In the Rif, the man who most strongly urges liquidation of these affairs is the one responsible for the crime, and his agnates. However, much beforehand accounts may be adjusted, the matter is over before they will see themselves free of the locusts in their quarters and before they will be able to save bread. After a few days, which are hard to stretch out, the provisions, already considerably reduced, will begin to get

000 they are obliged to assemble in order to keep them down. Furthermore,
437 we may see the alarming case in which the commercial transactions of
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152 some individuals with the Island of al-Husaima undergo a considerable increase; their gains, fabulously augmented through envy and general misery, permit their rivals to throw doubts and suspicion on the real origin of their opulence; having no other source of wealth, the latter impute frightful treacheries to them. Perhaps a bloodfeud or an
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177 accusation deprived more than one Amhaw (sing. of Imhawren) of a large Spanish pension from the above island[34].....All this and the constant
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623 inter-lineage hatreds charged the atmosphere in such a way that somebody had the idea, eagerly grasped by the rest, to hold a meeting in order to put an end to such a calamitous state of affairs.

623 When the date is established and has arrived, the meeting is held, without discussion of anything other than details, for in the preparatory work, as we have said, the participants have already reached the stage of assembling their criteria. There is no delay in expressing whatever must be considered a crime, nor even in the type and importance of the punishment, for as all of them committed sins or hoped for an occasion to do so, they had to establish a moderate punishment under a savage exterior, and, above all, a guarantee of not becoming enveloped in bloodfeuds.

623 For this reason, the popular assembly makes a collective and
687 graphic insult (Blanco: note b, in text), although afterwards this is
685 limited to a fine (Blanco" note c, in text) of fairly sizeable proportions which is imposed upon the smuggler and informer from al-Husaima Island or on a thief, in place of exterminating him. Thus public

nor a bastardization of his office. It creates guarantees for the accused, protecting him from bloodfeuds; it indemnifies the social unit, the subclan of Imhauren, from injuries caused by some of its members, so that when the fine is donated to the habus of the village mosque, through the particular conceptualization and application of these funds in the Rif, a part of the money always came back to the jma'th in kind; and the eagerness for a reward, as among participating European functionaries, who multiply the fines by increasing their investigations and denunciations in proportion to their needs, was discarded.

It has--and why not?--among its other defects one which is certainly a simple defect in editing, although the frequency with which it is repeated makes this doubtful in several cases. The intention (author's italics) (Blanco: note f, in text) is punished, but how can it be proven? According only to the prudent arbitration of the popular tribunal formed by the two aforementioned individuals. A bad business.

Curious and noteworthy is the palpable demonstration of this municipal letter, of this qanun of a jma'th, which is careful not to overstep the bounds of adjacent institutions, such as those of personal status law (inheritance, etc.) or of those handled by the immediately superior social unit, the clan, with its qanun approved and drawn up in the markets (murders and woundings, etc.), a fact which reveals the interrelationship and interdependence of the different social units, and even their institutions and how they function.

This qanun is limited, logically, to neighborhood questions, among which there figures in first place that of public security (espionage)[36] and secondly that of property.

671 Paragraph e: This paragraph distinguishes principals from accomplices or auxiliaries.

671 181 Paragraph f: A virile and rural society distrusts the veracity of the so-called humanitarian sentiments, closing its doors to the intrigues which, under such a mask, provoke influential individuals to save their allies and other interested aspirations which mock the objectives that the law, to which they freely gave themselves, pursues.

671 609 628 Paragraph g: We have here a precise and exact detail, an excellent delimitation of a truce, a recognition of Rifian public law (i.e. jural procedure) and interest protecting the stranger, to whom this law guarantees a wide and sufficient time of commercial activity and a prudent warning that he leave an open field to the fierce internal bloodfeuding. We have here a manifestation of the social unit, the clan, which shows us its reality and consistency, which recognizes a common interest and one superior to its own intestinal vendettas; and this permits it to guarantee to the neutral, to the stranger, a free passage and activity throughout its whole territory (author's italics).

671 695 Paragraph h: Two important additions are made here to the hurried first draft. It is necessary, first, to guarantee the person of the accused against the passions of the moment, the outward appearances, the ill-will and the outright suspicions, by means of evident proof (author's italics), offering him the means of avoiding such passions by taking oath. And in the second addendum (Paragraph i) they list, furthermore, and completing it, the duration of the truce or time of peace.

671 771 law, a lay law ignorant of religion even though it speaks of the Sacred Book, the irregular application of which, in such a recent and turbulent period, leaps into view, proving that Rifian Islamization is superficial.[57]

671 182 [778] [782] [779] [574] This pact combines all the pleasant conditions of the Rifian appetite. It is verified in the habitual place of reunion for transcendental acts, taking place under sacred protection, in addition to lubricating the agreement with the heathen rite of blood sacrifice, the Islamic promise of peace, and the feast day for the sober Rifian, an enforced vegetarian.[58]

671 182 614 619 It brings together the mass of the Aith 'Adhiya, a subclan of the khums (Rifian thakhammasth) of Aith Bu 'Ayyash; and democratic practice advises this mass not to mention the name of any individual in writing, as this might presuppose questions of distinction and preference, swelling their heads.

671 182 628 681 [511] It establishes the ddiyith[59], fixing it at 2000 duros, the maximum sanction which it is worth pointing out and imprinting indelibly in the minds of those who attend. This is a fabulous amount of money for the economic means of the people to whom it relates; and it is accepted as much out of the respect which radiates from it as from being generally admitted in analogous pacts of which they have news in neighboring districts.

671 628 681 184 443 It must be pointed out, in order to avoid the confusions which can arise from the different editorship of the qanuns, that the real ddiyith, or blood money (author's italics), does not, in reality, differ anywhere throughout the Rifian mountains, and must be valued at

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628 1000 duros[60]; for the double amount of 2000 duros which appears in
681 certain qanuns refers only to a single case and to the place in which
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443 the crime is committed--the suq, or tribal market.

681 In this single case the 2000-duro fine is imposed, and the
619 reason is simple: the crime in these conditions and in this place
443 reaches out to attack not only the prestige of the tribe but the common interests of Rifian society, and endangers them gravely; for, naturally, when news of the crime is spread by the regular constituents of the market, this keeps away the merchants from other places who have received word. This, in turn, brings about a commercial blockade (author's italics) of the tribe, which originates from insecurity of persons and property; for rare is the occasion that the tumult which murder and woundings bring about does not end up in pillage.

681 For this reason the Rifians saw themselves obliged to cut down rigorously and to threaten with heavy sanctions any crimes of this magnitude and kind, the gravest in the society. The ddiyith[61] is
681 therefore doubled in this case. We have here the reason, distinctly
628 made, why, in my opinion 1000 duros must be established as the fine
682 for homicide (a sanction which the clans of the Aith 'Abdallah and the
614 Aith Bu 'Ayyash both establish and which we encounter in the ribat, or
619 agreement, which allied such tribes as the Sanhajans of the Aith
443 Siddath to the Aith Khannus, and the Bni Gmil to the Bni Bu Frah), and
613 a further 1000 duros for homicide committed in the market; for the damage and disturbance affect not only a single lineage, but are prejudicial and shameful to the whole tribe, which by virtue of the laws of reprisal and blood-vengeance must fatten on any man who forgot his duties or obligations to it.

628 After the fixing of the ddiyith[62], there is the most laborious
691 agreement and the most hurried need for its enforcement; and the rest
673 of the resolutions have no objective other than that of embellishing
681 this, establishing a graded scale in conformity with the external manifestations of lesser crimes, which the Rifians did not deem necessary to put down in detail in their qanuns, in order to facilitate an easier mnemonic retention of the principal transgressions and resultant fines.

691 It points out theft with an admirable simplicity, according to
685 what is stolen, and it doubles the fine for a rustler of domestic
231 animals, a fact which follows the logical economic notion of the
556 Rifians of presenting such animals as the most esteemed source of wealth, as among nomad tribes.[63] It should be remembered that in the
178 old Rifian society, the consumption of meat was limited by the scarcity
262 of pasturage to Fridays, the holidays and by physiological needs, and
231 was regulated by the common sacrifice of animals and by compensating
224 hunts on fixed days.

If the meat supply diminished and they considered it indispensable, it would be completely natural to take precautions to preserve it.....For precisely this reason the Rifians judged the theft of
685 animals as a greater crime than that of grains, and sanctioned it ac-
673 cordingly.

671 8. QANUN OF THE AITH KHATTAB[64] (AITH WARYAGHAR), ESTABLISHING THE WEDNESDAY MARKET, AND GENERAL QANUN

A) Qanun:

Praise be to the One God. When peace reigned (literally,

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389 Any fisherman with dynamite is the owner of the fish and site of the explosion while he remains there. Fishermen with lines may not enter the radius of action of dynamite fishermen.

In fishing with explosives, the man who first sees the fish and stays to wait for them is entitled to remain in the spot observed. Nobody who has just arrived can shoot. For this reason, fishermen with explosives keep out of each others' way.

G) Recovery:

425 Any object without a known owner which is abandoned or tossed up on the beach by the sea is the property of whoever finds it.

Any object floating in the sea is the property of whoever picks it up; and if there are several people who put their hands on it in order to hoist it onto the boat or drag it onto the beach, it, or the proceeds from it, are divided equally among all who have worked, in the last instance, among the crew and the boat owners; but a man who sees it from the sea, for example, has no right to it, as he has not helped (577) to get it on board or ashore. Work, and not vision, is rewarded.

H) Arbiters:

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554 Arbiters are men who are skilled in maritime questions and excellent mediators whose reputation, in addition to the reduced coastal limits of their tribe(s), is known and commented upon in all the villages of the neighboring tribes; and to them the inhabitants of these villages go voluntarily in order to submit their differences of opinion when these deal with matters relating to the sea.

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642
115 Those who had most fame in the Rifian coast were, long ago, the Ghmara, to whose ports of Taghza and Tigisas it was not uncommon

628 628 554 671 692 [115] to see rival Rifian feluccas betaking themselves and respecting the verdict settled by some old seawolf, until they took over the doctrine and set up new clauses in the customary law and applied it with the same success spreading it in later times even to the Iqar'ayen; and finally one could see the Ibuqquyen going to Ajdir, submitting themselves to the arbitration of the so-called rm'addjim (Ar. m'allim), or master, who later reached the maximum position of being 'Abd al-Krim's Minister of Marine, during the Rifian War, this individual being the one who has provided me with most of the data to be found in this qanun. Among the Iqar'ayen the Ra'is Muhand n Bu Tahar of I'azzanen is well-known, and among the Ibuqquyen there is the pilot of Gardiner's yacht, l-Hadi n Dadi[117], and other old fisherman of the Aith Waryaghar and Ibuqquyen. These individuals were appealed to when the solutions of the ruyas (pl. of ra'is, or boat-masters) did not satisfy any of the parties in question.

628 554

I) Skills and Craft:

227 The net is an apparatus called dhrarsha. The procedure is analo- [171] [177] gous to that of Malaga, which renders its description unnecessary; the Rifians undoubtedly copied this through many trips to the latter place. I have seen it used in Badis and Qal'a Yirish, and the cut is exactly the same. The boat, called agharrabu, is a simple fishing boat; it weighs about a ton; its bow and stern are both well raised up and on a level with each other; it has two benches, a keel and a lateen sail, a mobile rudder; and it is some six meters in length. It is manned by four crew members and the master. On land, a sixth man is needed to put the cable down.

501

312 571 [613] [596] in the following turn it will take it up at night, and with another order among the irrigators in which the first in one turn will be the last in the next. These two classes of turns, this order of irrigation, is usually set up for the whole duration; when it is begun, the irrigators draw lots with small sticks or twigs, and, at other times, it is set up differently every day. The transfer of

312 571 425 [432] [805] [435] turns is free, as is the decision of the person to be favored. Turns of water are the object of buying and selling, and are independent of land. A 12-hour turn every week (eight days) comes to some 500 or 600 duros (1939).[124]

312 [821] The hour to begin irrigating is that of the rising or setting of the sun, according to whether the turn itself is diurnal or nocturnal. The repairs depend on their importance and where they are made, the users of the branch in question contributing to these, downstream. The outlets or cuts of water are the responsibility of

312 571 805 the individual who is irrigating at the time. The duration of turns was regulated by means of natural hours, those of the prayers, and by measurements of the shade and the angle of the same with some object, in other words, a true sun dial.

312 627 628 671 Differences were resolved, as noted, by means of arbitration, valuation or assessment, or indemnification, apart from governmental intervention if this is deemed necessary, as some qanuns express.

312 184 The variations in the treatment of ditches require the conformity of all the ditch-users to be expressed by themselves or their representatives personally, in a meeting convoked to this effect on the sites which are to be the objects of modification, in the system or traditions of irrigation.

224 Another agreement which is also apt to be made previously, if the hunting is not in shirka, is the case of l-'adaw[184], which is indicated further on, in order to find out if measurements must be taken from above or below.

Regarding the personnel of the hunt, these are generally organized into two groups: the hunters, who go along the lower areas, tracking and flushing game; and the beaters, located in the dominating area and indicating paths taken by the animals to the hunters. Any hunter who gets an animal must change places with a beater, to equalize the possibilities and give the members of the latter group a chance.

The hunters (Ar. mruyah, R. ingmarn) walk in groups or in a line. In the first instance, the dogs go ahead of the groups, and in a line, at the ends, but always with the larger group in order to cut the road better for the game and to preserve it, insofar as possible, from accidents. The disposition which the Aith Hadhifa adopt while hunting in shirka, for example, is in two bands: the local communities of Thizimmurin, Ihadduthen, Iharunen, Mishkur and Bihban from one, and those of Aith 'Amar u S'aid[185], Imrabdhen and Bashkra, the other[186]; and the meeting between both bands takes place in Aghir Inibdar, below Thizimmurin.

224 628

D) Arms:

224 411 [178] In the days of the Republik, Rifians hunted with firearms, ferrets, sticks, traps and net. Today they do not use firearms[187]; but practice and necessity have converted them into experts in the use of throwing sticks (r-mitrag). Each man carries two or three

224 619 689 114 182--According to informants in the Jbil of the Aith Waryaghar, this was not, and is not so. Hunting is neither obligatory, nor are there fixed days for it; people hunt entirely when they wish to do so, although nobody would think of doing so on Wednesday (market day) or Friday.

224 671 [114] [178] We wonder, too, if the Rifian hunting qanuns are in fact as detailed and as complex as Blanco would have us believe. Hunting is certainly less common now than it was, for instance, during the "Republik", and possibly the general knowledge of many of the fine points which Blanco has recorded has died in the interim. It is also possible that these same fine points may be in fact an indication of the relative lack of game in the Rif; that because the human population is relatively high and the animal population relatively low, provision must be made to establish priority rights of particular individuals to game, under any circumstances. Hunting regulations, as Blanco describes them for the Rif, are far more elaborate than they appear to be in the Central Atlas, where game (and large game, such as Barbary sheep, panthers and boar) is plentiful and where hunting is generally done with a bu shfar, the flintlock gun. There, the general rule of thumb is that anyone who hears a shot fired comes running, as any person present at a kill has the right to share the meat with the hunter (i.e. if the animal in question is not Koranically tabooed). In the Rif, game is small (jackals and boar are the largest animals, and both are getting progressively rarer) and not overly numerous, and people are many; hence the elaboration of these hunting qanuns. (Boar are of course not eaten, given the Muslim taboo on pig.)

000 183--This word we have been unable to find in the Jbil of the Aith Waryaghar, in which area hunters, collectively, are called ingmarn (sing. angmar), and where no one can really be termed a "hunt leader".

184--This term, as frequently shouted during a hunt as haw-haw-haw!, the hunting call proper, means "Here it is!" or "There it goes!" and is in fact the Rifian classificatory cousin to the English or Virginian fox-hunter's "Tally-Ho!"

[114] 185--Given mistakenly by Blanco as Aith 'Amar u Yahya.

224 628 613 614 186--In several communities of the clan of the Aith Hadhifa there are lineages of the Upper Imrabdhen (Rashkra, Zawith n Sidi 'Abd r-Qadar and Kammun), while one community (Dhamarkat) contains Lower Imrabdhen lineages.

However, the disposition of these two hunting bands does not appear to coincide with that of the two subclans of the Aith Hadhifa; for while in the first band, Ihadduthen, Mishkur and most of Bihban belong to the subclan of the Aith Bu Jdad (Aith Bujdat), Thizimmurin and Tharunen belong to that of the Iraqraqen; and while, in the second band, Aith 'Amar u S'aid and Bashkra both belong to Iraqraqen, the Imrabdhen are of course intrusive. It is, thus, far more likely and, indeed, a far more logical assumption, that the hunting-band organization described by Blanco follows territorial lines rather than purely segmentary ones; and proof of this can be ascertained from a glance at Blanco's tribal map of Aith Waryaghar in the appendix.

A, [No appendix is given--Analyst]

Within the ar-rba
619 there was a council (jemas) held irregularly to discuss and
[628] settle judicial matters generally pertaining to the blood feud.
[554] Only the more important families within the ar-rba had representation on the council.

613 The first social unit which is directly reflective of kin ties is the dharfiqth. Whereas tribal and ar-rba names refer to place names generally, the dharfiqth invariably carries the name of a real person, i.e. Aith 'Abdallah or Aith al-Qasim. The members of this group consider that they have a common agnate although they may not be able to demonstrate the genealogical linkage to this ancestor. The group theoretically includes all the sons of the founding ancestor and their offspring. Some dharfiquin seem to have increased in number and power while others grew smaller either through decimation in feuds or from splintering into rival dharfiquin. Solidarity seems to have rested mainly on sentiment, and in such an explosive atmosphere this is perhaps too fragile a mechanism for maintaining agnatic descent groups.

613 The dharfiqth is made up of a varying number of jujgu
596 which are localized patrilineal extended families which may be regarded as minimal lineages. Each ijujga consists of a man, his wife or wives, his married sons and their wives and children, along with his unmarried sons and daughters. When the referent of the ijujga dies, all his sons form separate and new jujgu. The composition of the ijujga is today an idealization since few
000 households contain the above list of relatives. Neolocality is

7: Mikesell K-4,5 (1955-1957) 1961 MX3 Rif MX3

611 Descent is patrilineal, and the number of paternal relatives a Moroccan can remember is always greater than the number on the mother's side.[a]

565 184 The important details of social stratification show little variation within the northern zone. Real or alleged descendants of the Prophet constitute the highest class. Among tribesmen, the most respected and important class is composed of gentlemen farmers. At the bottom of the scale are blacksmiths, market weighers and criers, musicians and dancers, and tinkers or other itinerant artisans. The Jews, regardless of their profession, are lowest in the scale.

621 184 Besides these aspects of religion and social organization, there are many features of settlement and livelihood that show little variation within the northern zone. The basic unit of settlement is the hamlet or farmstead. Settlements of more than a few hundred inhabitants are rare. For every farmer who grows cash crops there are at least a hundred others who are concerned only with their own or community needs. In all Morocco, subsistence farming and barter govern rural economy, and trading takes place at weekly markets held in the open air.

241 433 [437] [443] One of the clearest expressions of cultural diversity is the division of northern Morocco into zones of Arabic and Berber speech, a division which coincides with other cultural frontiers. Generally speaking, the eastern half of the area (Rif, Garet, Gal'aya) retains Berber speech, whereas the western half (Jbala, Ghmara) has been Arabized. The historical and cultural factors that have brought about this division will be considered in chapter iii.

175 631 648 A state, by minimum definition, is an extent of inhabited territory presided over by a government capable of asserting its authority. During most of its history, Morocco was hardly a state in this sense of the word. One of the important themes of Moroccan history is the division of the country into lands of government (*bilad al-makhzen*) and lands of dissidence (*bilad as-siba*). The belligerence of the free tribes was based not only on their hatred of taxes[b] and authoritarian order but also on their inability to conceive of any social or political unit larger than the tribe or confederation of tribes. Most of the Rif was part of the land of dissidence.[c] Jbala and Ghmara formed an intermediate zone, neither submissive nor openly rebellious in the face of domination from without. The plains of Wad Lukkus and the Gharb were easier to subdue.

619 628 [648] [571] [616] [712] Dissidence was expressed in intertribal and intratribal conflict as well as in opposition to the central government. In most of the Rif, and especially in Aith Wariyaghar, quarrels over ownership of land, water rights, and personal affronts led to blood feuds of extraordinary savagery. Some feuds did not end until one of the participating families was exterminated. Feuding and the necessity for defense gave rise to a complex system of alliances based in part upon moieties. In the days before the Spanish occupation, each house in Aith Wariyaghar had

[a] In popular writings Berber society is sometimes described as being influenced by matriarchy. This assumption is based upon the fact that Berber women are much more active and unabashed than the Arabized women of the towns; it is based also upon the tradition that the Garmantians were led by a queen or prophetess. E.-F. Gautier, "The Monument of Tin Hanan in the Ahaggar," *Geog. Rev.*, 24 (1934), 439–443. [113]

[b] *Makhzen* comes from the verb *khazana*, "to lock up" or "to hoard." The word is synonymous with "government" and more especially with the treasury department. E. Michaux-Bellaire, "Makhzen," *Encyclopedia of Islam* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1913–1938). [113]

[c] Nevill Barbour, ed., *A Survey of North West Africa (the Maghrib)* (London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 380–381. [113]

7: Mikesell K-4,5 (1955-1957) 1961 MX3 Rif MX3

a tower used as a lookout and blockhouse.[9] Conflict was most serious in the Rif, where it was necessary to establish a system of women's markets so that the members of feuding cantons or tribes could carry on a rudimentary trade. Another indication of the varying degrees of dissidence is the scale of fines imposed by customary law. The fine imposed for murder by the Aith Wariyaghar was four times as large as the fine for the same crime among the more pacific Sanhajan tribes.[10] In the laws of the Aith Seddath there is no mention of house-burning, a frequent occurrence in the Rif.

In the days before the European occupation the division between government and dissidence coincided with a division between authoritarian order and representative councils. This division might be described also as a contrast between Arab and Berber systems of government. The Berber system was based upon superimposed councils. The smallest was the council of a village or a number of scattered farmsteads. The second council, called the "council of the great," had jurisdiction over a canton. At least one and sometimes all members of the second council participated in the deliberations of a tribal council. The system was democratic, with rotation of authority; thus no one could gain excessive power. The Arab system was and is quite different, for authority rests with individuals, from the *qaid* who rules the tribe to the *shaikh* or *muqaddam* who rules the village or hamlet.

Of the many ceremonies that influence an individual's life, marriage is by far the most important. Here again there are marked differences from one area to another. In the Rif the wedding celebration lasts seven days; on the first four days, private feasts are held for the families involved; on the last three days, guests are invited to the feasts. In Jbala, Ghmara, and most of Sanhaja as-Srair the wedding celebration lasts only three nights. Other differences appear in the entertainment offered to the guests and the complicated rules that govern the behavior of the bride and groom.[11]

The other crises in the life of an individual—naming, the first haircut, and circumcision—vary correspondingly, as do the procedures related to death and burial. When a corpse is ready for burial in the Rif, it is carried on the door of the local mosque, and virtually the whole community turns out for the procession and funeral. In the Arabized sector of northern Morocco the body is usually carried by paid pallbearers, and only the immediate family may attend the burial. Among the Aith Bu Yihyi and Ulad Stut it is standard practice to carry the dead to the burial place on the back of a donkey or mule.[12]

The number of material traits that can be used as a basis for cultural differentiation is almost unlimited. Containers of skin and iron in Garet contrast with pottery in the Rif, and wooden vessels in Sanhaja as-Srair. Even within the Rif one may distinguish the handmade pottery in Igzinnayen, Aith Ammarth,

[9] Most of the towers were removed in 1922 by order of Abd al-Krim. D. M. Hart, "An Ethnographic Survey of the Riffian Tribe of Aith Wuryaghil," *Tamuda*, Revista de Investigaciones Marroquíes, 2 (1954), 38.

[10] For further information on customary law in the Rif, see E. Blanco Izaga, *El Rif: la ley reñeña* (Ceuta: Imprenta Imperio, 1939), pp. 71–75.

[11] Edward Westermarck, *Marriage Ceremonies in Morocco* (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1914).

[12] C. S. Coon, "Tribes of the Rif," *Harvard African Studies*, 9 (1931), 143–145.

[TEXT CONTINUED ON PAGE 9 1

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Rif n k 3

314 [village of Ulad 'Abd el-Mumin] *Caravan*

173 628 Over two generations ago, the Ulad 'Abd el-Mumin were exiled from their valley, but some of them returned. It is a long story;[8] a summary will suffice here.

It all started one chilly night when Amar the Scabhead shot a neighbor by mistake. Now the 'Abd el-Mumin had and still have neighbors, twenty-six families who call themselves Beni Tadmut, after their ancestress who was one of old 'Abd el-Mumin's daughters. It seems that the Ulad 'Abd el-Mumin had contracted an alliance by marriage with another clan over the ridge in the next tribe, the great and powerful Beni Urriaghel (later to produce the world-famous and still very much alive 'Abd el-Krīm). This Urriaghli clan was in trouble. Sorely pressed, it was besieged by a coalition of its neighbors, and hence sent a messenger with a goat over the ridge. This messenger sacrificed the goat on the sill of the mosque, so that blood spattered on its door, and this was a great shame compulsion, which no man of honor could refuse. Hence both the Ulad 'Abd el-Mumin and the Beni Tadmut, who shared the ancient mosque, went to the rescue.

They lifted the siege, but the enemy did not depart. One of the Tadmutis, creeping out on a reconnaissance by dim moonlight, was spotted by the aforementioned Amar the Scabhead, who shot him dead. At this a rumpus arose. Shots were exchanged, and with four parties involved it was hard to know who was shooting at whom. Sī 'Alī, the venerable and highly respected village schoolmaster, who served both clans as imām, was obviously the man to intervene, and he set forth from the huddled group of Ulad 'Abd el-Mumin in the direction of the Beni Tadmut, only a score of yards away. Unable to control their wrath, the Tadmutis shot him. At this point a hush fell over the scene, and by daybreak the two squadrons of kinsmen had gone home separately, carrying their dead. The Urriaghlis, over whom this trouble had arisen in the first place, fearing to stay at home, went along with the Ulad 'Abd el-Mumin who, outnumbered two to one, were glad of their company.

When the dead had been buried, the combatants found a half a hundred men gathered solemnly in council beneath their olive trees. These were the members of the *Asht Arba'in*, the councilors from all the villages up and down the valley, who had heard of trouble and hastened to the spot to keep it from spreading (while enjoying

[8] Told at length in Carleton S. Coon, *Flesh of the Wild Ox* (New York, 1932).

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in anticipation the meat of the fines which they hoped to collect). 173
The moderator of the council was M'allim Muḥammad, the wealth- 628
iest and most venerable of the Ulad 'Abd el-Mumin, whose position placed his newly made enemies at a disadvantage. This they pointed out immediately.

It was clear that the Beni Tadmut were the greater offenders. The council decided that both sides should pay blood money to each other, but the sum paid by the Tadmutis would be the greater. Both should pay a fine to the council for having made it necessary to call them together. The Tadmutis, however, demanded also that the Urriaghlis should be forced to leave. The amghar of the next valley, one Ḥajj Bukkeish (later to become an unsuccessful rival of 'Abd el-Krīm's in the war against Spain) agreed with the Tadmutis and swung the council to this opinion. The Ulad 'Abd el-Mumin, however, refused, pointing out that their kinsmen whom they were protecting had already had their houses burnt down and their trees felled, and might starve should they go home—if they were not shot first.

The meeting broke up without decision and without the collection of a fine. However, Bukkeish and the other leaders resolved to call together a greater meeting, a council of all five sections of the tribal confederation, each consisting of several valleys; thus three levels of deliberative bodies would be involved. The guests whom the Ulad 'Abd el-Mumin refused to eject were members of another and even more powerful confederation, and large-scale intertribal trouble might easily arise. Meanwhile, the day before the holy feast of el 'Aid el-Kabīr (when despite the trouble everyone was bustling around as we do on the day before Christmas) the schoolmaster of the Beni Tadmut appeared, unarmed, with a goat and two other unarmed men. Approaching the M'allim Muḥammad's house, he declared that he had come to make a truce, and invited the Ulad 'Abd el-Mumin to come to the mosque and swear an oath.

After much deliberation and with some misgivings, the M'allim Muḥammad agreed, and set out with two of his sons. The Tadmutis, as feared, had led them into an ambush. First the Tadmutis killed Amar the Scabhead, then the M'allim Muḥammad shot two of them and was shot in turn, through the head. One son, the Ḥajj Muḥammad, escaped, wounded in the foot. He crawled up on the mountain and hid behind a rock. The next day, as the Beni Tadmut left their houses all dressed in their new clothes, to go to the big mosque up

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173 the valley for prayer, he shot their schoolmaster and two others be-
628 fore his rifle jammed, and he wept.

Now the Tadmutis laid a shame compulsion on Bukkeish's men at the foot of the valley by slaughtering an ox on their mosque door, and more blood was shed, until finally the councilors convened from hill and valley, to sit like birds of prey at the scene of slaughter. Many angry words were said; finally a decision was made. The Ulad 'Abd el-Mumin had committed sacrilege by killing men, however much they deserved to die, on the holy feast day which the Prophet had designated as the end of the pilgrimage. For sacrilege there was only one punishment, exile. Leading a few thin cows the women of the Ulad 'Abd el-Mumin and the few men who remained alive climbed the path out of the valley, with the smoke of their houses rising behind them. One day they returned, but that is another story. In the meantime they lived in a village outside of Fez with other exiled Riffians, caring for the olive trees of rich Arabs and dreaming of revenge. Not all returned, and their children and grandchildren may be seen, blue eyed and yellow turbaned, near the Bab Gīsa in Fez.

621 This true story illustrates the Riffian system of government. The
614 unit of society above the family is not the village, but the clan, which
212 owing to the linear nature of the arable land, spread along narrow
191 watercourses, may be housed in several separate clusters of houses. Each clan has its own schoolmaster, who is also registrar of deeds, since he is always literate. Many of the other men are also. While their spoken language is Berber, they write in Arabic, usually more classical than the daily speech of the Moroccan Arabs, which but few of them can understand. Each village also has a blacksmith, a Negroid whose home is in Targuist, the arsenal tribe of 'Abd el-Krīm.

621 In each cluster one village stands out as the seat of a Friday
778 mosque, usually maintained by a holy descendant of even holier
792 saints, whose tombs adorn the landscape and serve as minor places of pilgrimage, especially by women. Up in the tribes of Beni Amart and Targuist several mutually related families of murabiṭīn, the Ikhemrijen, dwell in green-roofed edifices built by Spanish renegades.

623 The village needs no council because all the men are kin, and
867 there are no wards or ṣofs to split them. Rarely do the men number more than two or three dozen. The schoolboys, sitting in the mosque, play at government, with a mock Asht Arba'in of their own. On

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623 minor points of difference, the men let them arbitrate and set fines
867 of a few eggs or loaves of bread, for their own consumption. Having thus learned the routine of sitting in judgment and also some of the oral qanūns, the boys are ready for the serious business ahead.

623 Once a week, when the nearest market meets, the older men of
627 the neighboring villages, corresponding to the "brains" of the Kabyles, meet in a house just off the grounds, or in good weather, under a tree. Over glasses of tea they settle any disputes which may
628 come up in the market or which litigants may bring them. When
619 more serious matters arise, such as the trouble between the Ulad ʿAbd el-Mumin and the Beni Tadmut, the councilors of a single geographical unit, consisting of several clans, come together. They must be fed, and it is in the interest of the feuding parties to make a speedy settlement, with fines and blood money. Fines go to the councilors, who eat part and divide the rest. Blood money goes to the kin of the wounded or dead. If these councilors cannot settle the problem, the "fifth" is invoked—the whole series of little valleys and watershed cantons which forms the next largest political unit. Some tribes have only one "fifth," but Gzennaya and Beni Urriaghel each have five. If the "fifth" cannot settle the dispute, and the bloodshed spreads, then all the fifths join in. If the whole tribe is embroiled, the councilors of another tribe may invade and catch them unawares, to their great loss. The longer the fight remains unsettled the greater the number of participants, each new and larger body trying to capitalize on the confusion of the partisans.

It can be readily seen that few troubles reach intertribal proportions. This device of government in depth works. Feuding keeps the population down, and the fear of interference keeps the feud isolated and within bounds. Chronic troublemakers, and those who break the rules, must go. On the other hand when some outside force threatens more than a small portion of the Rif, the mechanism is at hand for all to unite, forcefully if ephemerally. The elders of one clan perform a compulsion of shame on another, thus forcing them into alliance, called *lif*, as elsewhere. As the danger grows, so
643 does the lif. In this manner ʿAbd el-Krīm (who had been educated by
721 the Spaniards) set up a government of the whole Rif, which defeated Spain in two great battles in 1921 and 1924, and but for the use of aircraft and tanks by his enemy, might have held the French army indefinitely at bay. No sultan had ever been able to conquer this classic corner of the Land of Insolence, which is all the more remark-

/239 cont./

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/footnote 1 continued/ of the Haha ("Organisation sociale et domestique des Haha /Social and Domestic Organization of the Haha/," pp. 10-11. Now there is an association of "ikhs" of diverse origins there. On the other hand, the bond of blood exists among the households of the same Riffian jema^{c}a.

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it includes about ten houses -- 30 to 40 hearths in all -- and becomes a group strong enough to defend itself. The "tarfiq" heads, willingly set off by the title of "amghar," are feared and respected because they can then assemble 40 or 50 "brothers" resolute for anything. For the most insignificant motive they take up arms and engage in bloody battles with the neighboring hamlets for long years. These are then veritable wars of extermination, which end only in the disappearance or exile of the vanquished. The following example, selected in the fraction of the Aït ^{c}Abdallah, of the tribe of the Beni Ouriaghel, favorite country for soff struggles, will give the measure of the violence of these rivalries capable of breaking most of the social ties.

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Discord broke out not long ago between two villages, each peopled by a "tarfiq," the Aït Qasem and the Ibouneharen, following the killing of a dog that belonged to the guest of an amghar. When the Aït Qasem refused to pay the blood price of the dog, namely 50 douros, claimed by the amghar, it came to blows and to war. Twelve men were killed the first day. In the following years 40 men died on one side, 62 on the other, in regular combat, not counting those who were assassinated for vengeance. Finally, the defeated party decided to leave the country. Old men were then seen to take refuge with the women and children in the sacred mountain of the Zerhoun, after having sold their goods in order to be able, in one last effort, to buy a murderer who would avenge their dead. The conditions under which this last was to make the designated enemy disappear were carefully detailed and the stipulations passed before the ^{c}adoul; if the shot killed the adversary, the recompense was /240/ 10,000

[722]
[435]

621 /240 cont./
628 reals; 5,000 if it only wounded him; if the bullet missed its
613 goal, 2,500. The marksman, however, fortunate or awkward,
726 perished the next day, struck perhaps by a child hidden with a
[435] gun in a thicket of lentiscus.

It is understandable that under these conditions the notion of
613 "khoms" is often obscure; the only group that can exist then is
619 the family, around which assemble by bonds of adoption and marriage the weakest groups and the outsiders so as to form the "tarfiq."

613 Discords sometimes become so violent that material life
628 frequently stops; only the women then dare to go out into the fields; the men come to pray at the mosque without abandoning
613 their guns. In these circumstances, the family heads of the
628 whole country gather together in order to decide on a "ribat," which is respected for several months. This name is given to a
675 solemn agreement that binds all the members of the neighboring tribes to repress, by means of very high fines, murders, rapes, large thefts, aggressions at the markets or on the roads leading to
[681] them. The sums paid by the guilty, which can climb to several thousand douros, are divided among the contracting tribes. The "amghars," heads of the most powerful families, have only the small personal part that goes to them just as to mere individuals.

628 Among the less turbulent tribes of the Rif, as at Targist, at
184 Zerqet, among the Beni Gmil, private wars have not reached as
621 great a development since the inhabitants still succeed in living grouped in hamlets. The "mouda^{c}" or subfractions and even the
632 "khoms" sometimes summon all the warriors in order to delib-
621 erate common affairs. This meeting, to which each one comes
613 armed, takes the name "agrao" as in the Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/ and the Moyen-Atlas /Middle Atlas/. Sometimes the chiefs of
[681] each of the important families put at the head of the khoms an
[671] amghar whose role is to see to the application of the customary law, to have the fines, or "insaf," paid, with which crimes are punished according to rules known by all, but not written. Like
[652] the moqaddem in the western Atlas, this amghar collects one third of the "insaf"; the other two parts go to the tribe.

/240 cont./

628 182 642 But in these less wild regions, the periods of calm are nevertheless short and do not leave these rudimentary institutions /241/ time to perfect themselves. Anarchy and fights by families infuriated by vengeances have never permitted the Riffians to know a government by regularly elected leaders, changed in turn, or the use of common funds. Only the holy-war treasuries, organized by pious establishments, existed at all times. Hate for the Christian can indeed dominate the strongest feelings; whatever may be the violence of the disputes that divide them, the notables always agree enough to go shares in small sums of money intended for the purchase of bullets in order to go to aim at the detested soldiers of the "Peñon" /Rock/ of Alhucemas or Badès (1).

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[113] 1. Compare A. Bernard, Les Confins algéro-marocains /The Algero-Moroccan Borders/, p. 89 and sqq.

000 XII. The republics of the Kabylie /Kabylia/. -- It is above all between the social organization of the Kabylie /Kabylia/ before the French conquest and that of the western Haut-Atlas /High Atlas/ that it is possible to multiply the comparisons in order to find profound analogies under the apparent differences. It is easy, as a matter of fact, to see that the small republics of the Tichka or of the Jbel Kest, sequestered in the high valleys of the South of Morocco, and the ones that have grown and prospered on the summits of the Djurjura live with similar institutions, share the same positive and limited ideal, suffer from identical ills, and are subject to the same rules of existence, to the same laws of development.

The territory of the "ᶜarch" is, as we have seen, equivalent to that of a small "taqbilt" of the Sous; both form, in the free state, autonomous and often even independent political units. But in one of the regions the slight density of the population of a country where human life is difficult, in the other the